Analytic Philosophy

Papers
(The median citation count of Analytic Philosophy is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-05-01 to 2026-05-01.)
ArticleCitations
Issue Information6
What can preemption do?5
Cross‐temporal grounding5
Deceiving versus manipulating: An evidence‐based definition of deception5
Towards a Fregean psycholinguistics5
Experiential parts4
Wittgenstein on necessity: ‘Are you not really an idealist in disguise?’4
A Flaw in Sider's Vagueness Argument for Perdurantism: Endurantism Endures4
From indeterminacy in a fundamental theory to fundamental indeterminacy?4
On being a lonely brain‐in‐a‐vat: Structuralism, solipsism, and the threat from external world skepticism3
Grounding and boundaries3
Contingent Grounding Physicalism3
Familiar properties and phenomenal properties3
The act‐type theory of propositions as a theory of what is said3
Why Trivialist Platonism Cannot be Both Trivialist and Platonist3
Visual indeterminacy2
Internal Reasons and Agent‐Neutrality2
AI Alignment Versus AI Ethical Treatment: 10 Challenges2
Naked statistical evidence and verdictive justice2
Comments on Emotion and Virtue by Gopal Sreenivasan2
Bullshit activities2
In Defense of Pragmatism2
Minimalism's continued creep: Subject matter2
Regret for the Defeated Directive2
Linearism, Universalism and Scope Ambiguities2
A Hundred Thousand Darlingtons: Self‐Respect, Moral Judgement, and the Right to an Equal Democratic Say2
Laws and Reasons Why2
Issue Information2
2
1
Can we combine practical and epistemic reason?1
Reason and reciprocity: A response to Emotion and Virtue1
1
Fitting emotions and virtuous judgment1
Against the inside out argument1
Issue Information1
Issue Information1
A New Hilbert's Hotel Argument Against Past‐Eternalism1
Advice as a model for reasons1
Issue Information1
Time, Sociality, Institutions: The Core Capacity Conjecture1
Glad to be alive: How we can compare a person's existence and her non‐existence in terms of what is better or worse for this person1
1
Room for Improvement: Why Finitist Arguments Do Not Check Out1
What physicalism could be1
Truth and imprecision1
A recently recurring mistake over Russell's theory of descriptions1
1
1
On scepticism about personal identity thought experiments1
Virtue and its moral psychology0
Agent‐switching, plight inescapability and corporate agency0
0
Lessons from the void: What Boltzmann brains teach0
Minimalism and Metaphysical Residue0
The Abductivist Interpretation of Frege's Conception of Logic0
An instrumentalist explanation of pragmatic encroachment0
Modeling action: Recasting the causal theory0
What Second‐Best Epistemology Could Be0
0
Curry, dialectic and the modal ontological argument0
Defending The Open Future: Replies to MacFarlane, Green, Wasserman, and Bigg & Miller0
Outsourcing Love0
Personal‐identity non‐cognitivism *0
Deductive Inference and Mental Agency0
‘Emotions’ in Gopal Sreenivasan's Emotion and Virtue0
Temporal Passage in a Fragmented World0
0
Constructivism for Consciousness0
Bad Practices: Unintended Consequences of Practice‐Based Theories of Reference0
Backtracking Counterfactuals and Evolutionary Sequences0
Linnebo on reference by abstraction0
Politics and suffering0
When Is Evidence No Longer Prior?0
Giving up gratitude0
Todd on the open future0
Dependence and Fictional Characters0
Issue Information0
Bringing the deep self back to the racecourse: Rethinking accountability and the deep self0
Frege on logical axioms and non‐evidential epistemic warrants: A paragraph from Grundgesetze0
Social construction and indeterminacy0
Is the abstract vs concrete distinction exhaustive & exclusive? Four reasons to be suspicious0
Justification, Excuse, and Dispositions to Follow Norms0
Issue Information0
0
All About Carnap's Babylon0
Varieties of future‐contingency0
Lucky artists0
Certainties and the Bedrock of Moral Reasoning: Three Ways the Spade Turns0
Expressing 2.00
Against the very idea of a perceptual belief0
Simulations All the Way Up! An Atheist's Response to the Fine‐Tuning Argument0
On the idea that all future tensed contingents are false0
Issue Information0
Do substances have formal parts?0
The Concept of Categoricity0
Issue Information0
0
On the Epistemic Insignificance of Perceptual Phenomenology0
A metapragmatic stereotype‐based account of reclamation0
The Strength of Assertion0
Categorial versus naturalized epistemology0
Platonic qua predication0
The good and the powers0
Metaethics as conceptual engineering0
Self‐Visitation and the Metaphysics of Place, Causation, and Facts0
Dogmatism and Easy Knowledge: Avoiding the Dialectic?0
Against Metaphysical Egalitarianism0
Conditional causal decision theory reduces to evidential decision theory0
Issue Information0
Why future contingents are not all false*0
How to choose normative concepts0
The Blind‐Sight of Statistical Evidence0
Is distinct location evidence of distinct objects? Multilocation and the problem of parsimony0
0
Meaning change0
Epistemic obligations and free speech0
The null hypothesis for fiction and logical indiscipline0
Issue Information0
On the Quality of Relational Justice0
From Moral Supervenience to Moral Contingentism (In One Easy Step!)0
Total pragmatic encroachment and belief–desire psychology0
Endurantism, presentism, and the problem of temporary intrinsics0
Introduction0
Reasons, attenuators, and virtue: A novel account of pragmatic encroachment0
Freedom and its unavoidable trade‐off0
An open problem for the metaphysics of constitutive standards0
Perceptual constancy and perceptual representation0
0
Representationalism and the Spatial Representational Contents of Afterimage Experiences0
0
Issue Information0
A Theory of Sense‐Data0
Flow and presentness in experience0
Sufficient Reason Vindicated0
Issue Information0
The causal structure of Frankfurt‐ and PAP‐style cases0
Kripkean conceivability and epistemic modalities0
0
The Dogmatism Puzzle Undone0
Validity as (material!) truth‐preservation in virtue of form0
Consistent desires and climate change0
Experience and Time: A Metaphysical Approach0
No double‐halfer embarrassment: A reply to Titelbaum0
A Modest Conception of Moral Right & Wrong0
0
Issue Information0
Neo‐Humean rationality and two types of principles0
Ontology After Folk Psychology; or, Why Eliminativists Should Be Mental Fictionalists0
Issue Information0
Issue Information0
0.085057973861694