Theoretical Economics

Papers
(The TQCC of Theoretical Economics is 3. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-02-01 to 2024-02-01.)
ArticleCitations
Costly miscalibration22
Sequential persuasion21
A model of weighted network formation16
Convergence in models of misspecified learning13
Information aggregation in competitive markets11
Bounded rationality and limited data sets11
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard11
Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility10
Censorship as optimal persuasion10
A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks10
Relational communication9
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets8
Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions8
Experimentation in organizations8
Dynamically stable matching7
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems7
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance7
Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment6
Communication with forgetful liars6
Persuasion with unknown beliefs6
Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications5
Macro‐financial volatility under dispersed information5
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing5
Agendas in legislative decision‐making5
Deep and shallow thinking in the long run5
Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries, and competing paths of diffusion in networks5
Long information design5
On selecting the right agent5
Bayesian privacy5
Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes5
Chain stability in trading networks4
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers4
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling4
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting4
Statistical sunspots4
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade4
Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs4
Sustainable debt4
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations4
Revenue from matching platforms4
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions4
Slow persuasion4
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors4
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning4
Robust contracting under double moral hazard3
Cooperative strategic games3
Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games3
When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?3
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification3
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating3
Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy3
Rational bubbles and middlemen3
Evolution, heritable risk, and skewness loving3
Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima3
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes3
Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation, and stochastic choice3
Random ambiguity3
Malthusian stagnation is efficient3
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets3
The implementation of stabilization policy3
Delegating learning3
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