Theoretical Economics

Papers
(The TQCC of Theoretical Economics is 4. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-05-01 to 2026-05-01.)
ArticleCitations
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 330
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 325
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination23
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 417
Naive calibration16
Ex post approaches to prioritarianism and sufficientarianism14
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 412
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament12
Transparent matching mechanisms11
Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: The curse of profitability11
Competitive and revenue‐optimal pricing with budgets10
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 29
Forward‐looking experimentation of correlated alternatives9
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 19
Data and incentives9
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning9
Paying with information9
Unified gross substitutes and inverse isotonicity for equilibrium problems9
An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money8
Weight‐ranked divide‐and‐conquer contracts8
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade8
Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence8
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs7
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions7
Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences7
Adoption epidemics and viral marketing7
Asset bubbles and product market competition6
Optimal sequential contests6
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 46
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 46
Stable matching: An integer programming approach6
Unrestricted information acquisition6
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers5
Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers5
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion4
Sensitivity versus size: Implications for tax competition4
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game4
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness4
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification4
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness4
To infinity and beyond: A general framework for scaling economic theories4
Boundedly rational demand4
Pervasive signaling4
Subjective information choice processes4
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