OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The TQCC of Theoretical Economics is 4. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-11-01 to 2024-11-01.)

Article	Citations
Sequential persuasion	27
Costly miscalibration	25
A model of weighted network formation	21
Censorship as optimal persuasion	16
Convergence in models of misspecified learning	16
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance	15
Bounded rationality and limited data sets	14
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard	14
Dynamically stable matching	12
Information aggregation in competitive markets	12
A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks	12
Relational communication	12
Experimentation in organizations	11
Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility	11
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	10
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets	9
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems	9
Bayesian privacy	8
Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries, and competing paths of diffusion in networks	8
Information design in multistage games	8
Persuasion with unknown beliefs	8
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	8
Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions	8
Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes	8
When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?	7

Deep and shallow thinking in the long run	7
Communication with forgetful liars	7
Sufficientarianism	6
Which misspecifications persist?	6
Family ties: School assignment with siblings	6
Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment	6
Rational bubbles and middlemen	6
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations	6
Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents	6
Slow persuasion	6
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning	6
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	6
Agendas in legislative decision‐making	6
Revenue from matching platforms	6
Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games	5
Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents	5
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions	5
Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs	5
Random ambiguity	5
Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications	5
On selecting the right agent	5
Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation, and stochastic choice	5
Delegating learning	5
Long information design	5
Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima	5
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification	5
Macro‐financial volatility under dispersed information	5
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	5
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule	4
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers	4
Cooperative strategic games	4
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs	4
A maximum likelihood approach to combining forecasts	4
Monitoring experts	4
Unrestricted information acquisition	4
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	4
Statistical sunspots	4
Chain stability in trading networks	4
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	4
Optimal sequential contests	4
Sustainable debt	4
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	4
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	4