OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The TQCC of Theoretical Economics is 3. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-02-01 to 2025-02-01.)

Article	Citations
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	16
Informed intermediaries	14
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information	14
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations	12
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	11
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	9
Robust performance evaluation of independent agents	9
Progressive participation	9
Exploiting social influence in networks	8
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers	8
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	7
Which misspecifications persist?	6
Efficient incentives with social preferences	6
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	6
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	6
Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in stochastic dynamic programming	6
Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy	6
Statistical sunspots	6
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 3	6
Long information design	5
Rational bubbles and middlemen	5
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof	5
When Walras meets Vickrey	5
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs	5

Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty	5
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning	5
Asset bubbles and product market competition	4
In the shadow of shadow banking: A liquidity perspective	4
The implications of pricing on social learning	4
Time‐consistent implementation in macroeconomic games	4
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good	4
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	4
Information design in multistage games	4
Bargaining with evolving private information	4
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 4	4
Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach	4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	4
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	3
Sufficientarianism	3
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	3
Information aggregation in Poisson elections	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 1	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	3
On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 1	3
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	3
Surprise and default in general equilibrium	3
Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers	3
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	3
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	3
Loss aversion in sequential auctions	3
Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	3
Optimal sequential contests	3