OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The TQCC of Theoretical Economics is 4. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-08-01 to 2025-08-01.)

Article	Citations
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	23
Informed intermediaries	22
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	19
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	18
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	16
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”	15
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	15
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	13
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	12
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	12
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	11
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	11
Data and incentives	11
Choosing what to pay attention to	11
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	10
Value‐based distance between information structures	10
Paying with information	9
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test	9
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	9
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	9
How to sell in a sequential auction market	8
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	8
Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences	8
An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money	8
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions	8

Adoption epidemics and viral marketing	8
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	8
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	8
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	8
Progressive participation	7
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	7
Asset bubbles and product market competition	7
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	7
Statistical sunspots	7
When Walras meets Vickrey	6
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	6
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	6
Optimal sequential contests	6
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	5
To infinity and beyond: A general framework for scaling economic theories	5
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	5
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	5
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	5
Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers	5
Subjective information choice processes	5
Unrestricted information acquisition	5
Boundedly rational demand	4
Attack and interception in networks	4
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state	4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 2	4
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public	4
Experimentation in organizations	4
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	4
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification	4
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization	4
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes	4
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	4
Pervasive signaling	4
Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability	4
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard	4
Conveying value via categories	4