OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The TQCC of Theoretical Economics is 4. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-05-01 to 2025-05-01.)

Article	Citations
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	20
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	18
Informed intermediaries	14
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	13
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	12
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	11
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	11
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”	11
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	10
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	9
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	9
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	9
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	9
Data and incentives	9
Choosing what to pay attention to	9
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	8
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test	8
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	8
Paying with information	8
Value‐based distance between information structures	8
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	7
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions	7
How to sell in a sequential auction market	7
Asset bubbles and product market competition	6
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	6

Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	6
Statistical sunspots	6
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	6
Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	5
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	5
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	5
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
When Walras meets Vickrey	5
Progressive participation	5
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	5
Boundedly rational demand	4
Optimal sequential contests	4
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	4
Pervasive signaling	4
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state	4
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	4
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	4
Subjective information choice processes	4
Experimentation in organizations	4
Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability	4
Unrestricted information acquisition	4
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	4
Attack and interception in networks	4
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	4