OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 2. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-11-01 to 2025-11-01.)

Article	Citations
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	24
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 3	24
Informed intermediaries	22
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	20
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	20
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	18
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	17
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”	15
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	14
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	13
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	12
Data and incentives	12
Choosing what to pay attention to	12
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	12
Paying with information	11
Forward‐looking experimentation of correlated alternatives	11
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	11
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	11
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	11
Value‐based distance between information structures	10
Unified gross substitutes and inverse isotonicity for equilibrium problems	10
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	10
How to sell in a sequential auction market	9
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test	9
Weight‐ranked divide‐and‐conquer contracts	9

An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money	9
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions	9
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	9
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	8
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	8
Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences	8
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	8
Adoption epidemics and viral marketing	8
Asset bubbles and product market competition	7
Statistical sunspots	7
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	7
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	7
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	6
When Walras meets Vickrey	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	6
Progressive participation	6
Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	6
Optimal sequential contests	5
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	5
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	5
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	5
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	5
Subjective information choice processes	5
To infinity and beyond: A general framework for scaling economic theories	5
Unrestricted information acquisition	5
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	5
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	5
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	4
Experimentation in organizations	4
Boundedly rational demand	4
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard	4
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization	4
Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty	4
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes	4
Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability	4
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state	4
Tâtonnement in matching markets	4
Conveying value via categories	4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 2	4
Sensitivity versus size: Implications for tax competition	4
Attack and interception in networks	4
Pervasive signaling	4
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification	4
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public	4
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	4
Gradual learning from incremental actions	3
Bargaining with evolving private information	3
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions	3

∀ or ∃?	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	3
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	3
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	3
Efficient and strategy‐proof mechanism under general constraints	3
Interview hoarding	3
Rational bubbles and middlemen	3
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 2	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	3
Random utility coordination games on networks	3
Long information design	3
Persuasion with unknown beliefs	2
Correlated choice	2
Dynamically stable matching	2
Equilibrium existence in games with ties	2
Queueing to learn	2
Time‐consistent fair social choice	2
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly	2
Bayesian comparative statics	2
Slow persuasion	2
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	2
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions	2
Optimal allocations with α‐MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and prospect theory	2
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade	2
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule	2
Stability in repeated matching markets	2
Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack	2
Strategic investment evaluation	2
Stochastic impatience and the separation of time and risk preferences	2
Two‐stage majoritarian choice	2
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets	2