OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-09-01 to 2025-09-01.)

Article	Citations
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	23
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	22
Informed intermediaries	22
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	18
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	18
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 3	16
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	15
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”	15
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	12
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	12
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	12
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	11
Value‐based distance between information structures	11
Data and incentives	11
Choosing what to pay attention to	11
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	11
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	11
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	11
Paying with information	10
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	9
Unified gross substitutes and inverse isotonicity for equilibrium problems	9
How to sell in a sequential auction market	9
Forward‐looking experimentation of correlated alternatives	9
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions	9
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test	9

On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	9
Weight‐ranked divide‐and‐conquer contracts	8
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	8
Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences	8
An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money	8
Adoption epidemics and viral marketing	7
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	7
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	7
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	7
When Walras meets Vickrey	6
Asset bubbles and product market competition	6
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	6
Statistical sunspots	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	6
Progressive participation	6
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	5
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	5
Unrestricted information acquisition	5
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	5
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	5
Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers	5
Optimal sequential contests	5
Subjective information choice processes	4
Boundedly rational demand	4
Attack and interception in networks	4
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes	4
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification	4
To infinity and beyond: A general framework for scaling economic theories	4
Pervasive signaling	4
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state	4
Sensitivity versus size: Implications for tax competition	4
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	4
Experimentation in organizations	4
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	4
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	4
Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability	4
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard	4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 2	3
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public	3
Long information design	3
Rational bubbles and middlemen	3
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions	3
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	3
Tâtonnement in matching markets	3
Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	3
Interview hoarding	3

Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization	3
Conveying value via categories	3
Bargaining with evolving private information	3
Gradual learning from incremental actions	3
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	3
Slow persuasion	2
Equilibrium existence in games with ties	2
∀ or ∃?	2
Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack	2
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	2
Persuasion with unknown beliefs	2
Stability in repeated matching markets	2
Stochastic impatience and the separation of time and risk preferences	2
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions	2
Dynamically stable matching	2
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 2	2
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions	2
Correlated choice	2
Random utility coordination games on networks	2
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule	2
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	2
Time‐consistent fair social choice	2
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	2
Strategic investment evaluation	2
Efficient and strategy‐proof mechanism under general constraints	2
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	1
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: The general equilibrium perspective	1
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	1
In the shadow of shadow banking: A liquidity perspective	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 3	1
Two‐stage majoritarian choice	1
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly	1
Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions	1
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers	1
Digital currency and privacy	1
On bargaining norms as solutions to cost–minimization problems	1
Empirical welfare economics	1
Wages as signals of worker mobility	1
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers	1
Efficient incentives with social preferences	1
Queueing to learn	1
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets	1
On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules	1
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade	1
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems	1
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization	1
Regret‐free truth‐telling in school choice with consent	1
Direct implementation with evidence	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	1
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes	1
Exploiting social influence in networks	1
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information	1
Optimal allocations with α‐MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and prospect theory	1
Bayesian comparative statics	1
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium	1
The Dynamics of Instability	1
Relational enforcement	1
Sufficientarianism	1