OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-02-01 to 2025-02-01.)

Article	Citations
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	16
Informed intermediaries	14
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information	14
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations	12
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	11
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	9
Robust performance evaluation of independent agents	9
Progressive participation	9
Exploiting social influence in networks	8
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers	8
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	7
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 3	6
Which misspecifications persist?	6
Efficient incentives with social preferences	6
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	6
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	6
Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in stochastic dynamic programming	6
Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy	6
Statistical sunspots	6
Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty	5
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning	5
Long information design	5
Rational bubbles and middlemen	5
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof	5

When Walras meets Vickrey	5
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs	5
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	4
Asset bubbles and product market competition	4
In the shadow of shadow banking: A liquidity perspective	4
The implications of pricing on social learning	4
Time‐consistent implementation in macroeconomic games	4
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good	4
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	4
Information design in multistage games	4
Bargaining with evolving private information	4
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 4	4
Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach	4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	3
Optimal sequential contests	3
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	3
Sufficientarianism	3
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	3
Information aggregation in Poisson elections	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 1	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	3
On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 1	3
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	3
Surprise and default in general equilibrium	3
Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers	3
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	3
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	3
Loss aversion in sequential auctions	3
Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions	3
Robust comparative statics for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution	2
Subjective information choice processes	2
Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms	2
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions	2
Gradual learning from incremental actions	2
The Dynamics of Instability	2
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	2
Interview hoarding	2
Unrestricted information acquisition	2
Dynamic economics with quantile preferences	2
∀ or ∃?	2
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	2
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	2
The property rights theory of production networks	2
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes	2
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	1
Stability in repeated matching markets	1
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers	1

Symmetric reduced‐form voting	1
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization	1
Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice	1
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	1
Slow persuasion	1
Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation, and stochastic choice	1
On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators	1
Contracting over persistent information	1
Auction design with data‐driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation	1
Direct implementation with evidence	1
Collective hold‐up	1
Wages as signals of worker mobility	1
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	1
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”	1
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	1
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	1
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems	1
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions	1
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	1
Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs	1
Which networks permit stable allocations? A theory of network‐based comparisons	1
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	1
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: The general equilibrium perspective	1