OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-05-01 to 2025-05-01.)

Article	Citations
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	20
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	18
Informed intermediaries	14
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	13
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	12
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	11
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models	11
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”	11
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	10
Data and incentives	9
Choosing what to pay attention to	9
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	9
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	9
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	9
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	9
Paying with information	8
Value‐based distance between information structures	8
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	8
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test	8
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	8
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 4	7
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions	7
How to sell in a sequential auction market	7
Asset bubbles and product market competition	6
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	6

Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	6
Statistical sunspots	6
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	6
Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 2	5
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	5
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	5
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
When Walras meets Vickrey	5
Progressive participation	5
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	5
Unrestricted information acquisition	4
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	4
Attack and interception in networks	4
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	4
Boundedly rational demand	4
Optimal sequential contests	4
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	4
Pervasive signaling	4
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state	4
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	4
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	4
Subjective information choice processes	4
Experimentation in organizations	4
Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability	4
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard	3
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization	3
Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty	3
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	3
Gradual learning from incremental actions	3
Bargaining with evolving private information	3
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes	3
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public	3
Conveying value via categories	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	3
Interview hoarding	3
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 2	3
Long information design	3
Rational bubbles and middlemen	3
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	3
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions	3
Stability in repeated matching markets	2
Slow persuasion	2
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions	2
Equilibrium existence in games with ties	2
Correlated choice	2

Dynamically stable matching	2
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 3	2
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	2
Persuasion with unknown beliefs	2
Time‐consistent fair social choice	2
∀ or ∃?	2
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions	2
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	2
Strategic investment evaluation	2
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule	2
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes	1
Wages as signals of worker mobility	1
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers	1
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium	1
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	1
Exploiting social influence in networks	1
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: The general equilibrium perspective	1
The Dynamics of Instability	1
On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules	1
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade	1
Bayesian comparative statics	1
In the shadow of shadow banking: A liquidity perspective	1
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information	1
Efficient incentives with social preferences	1
Direct implementation with evidence	1
Sufficientarianism	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 3	1
Optimal allocations with α‐MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and prospect theory	1
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly	1
Two‐stage majoritarian choice	1
Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions	1
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs	1