OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-06-01 to 2026-06-01.)

Article	Citations
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 3	32
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	26
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination	24
Marginal stochastic choice	17
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 4	17
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 21 Iss. 2	14
Ex post approaches to prioritarianism and sufficientarianism	12
Naive calibration	12
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament	12
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 4	11
Transparent matching mechanisms	10
Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: The curse of profitability	10
Competitive and revenue‐optimal pricing with budgets	9
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	9
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	9
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning	9
Paying with information	9
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 21 Iss. 2	9
Unified gross substitutes and inverse isotonicity for equilibrium problems	9
Data and incentives	8
Weight‐ranked divide‐and‐conquer contracts	8
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	8
An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money	8
Forward‐looking experimentation of correlated alternatives	8
Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences	7

Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions	7
Adoption epidemics and viral marketing	7
Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence	7
Optimally stubborn. How long to hold and who will fold?	6
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	6
Asset bubbles and product market competition	6
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	6
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers	5
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 4	5
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game	5
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	5
Unrestricted information acquisition	5
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion	4
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	4
Strategic disclosure in networks	4
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	4
Boundedly rational demand	4
To infinity and beyond: A general framework for scaling economic theories	4
Optimal sequential contests	4
Subjective information choice processes	4
Pervasive signaling	4
Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers	4
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 2	3
Attack and interception in networks	3
Chaos and unpredictability with time inconsistent policy makers	3
A continuum model as a limit of large finite matching markets	3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 2	3
Gradual learning from incremental actions	3
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization	3
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 3	3
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes	3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 2	3
Interview hoarding	3
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions	3
Conveying value via categories	3
Tâtonnement in matching markets	3
Sensitivity versus size: Implications for tax competition	3
Screening for breakthroughs	3
Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty	3
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	3
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	3
Bargaining with evolving private information	3
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium	2
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 3	2
Random utility coordination games on networks	2
Stability in repeated matching markets	2
Coarse revealed preference	2

Time‐consistent fair social choice	2
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 21 Iss. 1	2
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade	2
Efficient incentives with social preferences	2
Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack	2
∀ or ∃?	2
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	2
Strategic investment evaluation	2
Asymptotic value of monitoring structures in stochastic games	2
Queueing to learn	2
Optimal allocations with α‐MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and prospect theory	2
Efficient and strategy‐proof mechanism under general constraints	2
Slow persuasion	2
Correlated choice	2
Equilibrium existence in games with ties	2
Stochastic impatience and the separation of time and risk preferences	2
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: The general equilibrium perspective	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 1	1
Digital currency and privacy	1
Safe implementation	1
Fostering collaboration	1
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 1	1
Exploiting social influence in networks	1
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers	1
Wages as signals of worker mobility	1
Relational enforcement	1
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization	1
Empirical welfare economics	1
Regret in durable‐good monopoly	1
Probabilistic verification in mechanism design	1
Time consistency, temporal resolution indifference, and the separation of time and risk	1
In the shadow of shadow banking: A liquidity perspective	1
Direct implementation with evidence	1
Coordination with sequential information acquisition	1
On bargaining norms as solutions to cost–minimization problems	1
Regret‐free truth‐telling in school choice with consent	1
The Dynamics of Instability	1
Commonality of information and commonality of beliefs	1
Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions	1
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information	1
On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules	1
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs	1