OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-11-01 to 2024-11-01.)

Article	Citations
Sequential persuasion	27
Costly miscalibration	25
A model of weighted network formation	21
Convergence in models of misspecified learning	16
Censorship as optimal persuasion	16
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance	15
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard	14
Bounded rationality and limited data sets	14
Relational communication	12
Dynamically stable matching	12
Information aggregation in competitive markets	12
A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks	12
Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility	11
Experimentation in organizations	11
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	10
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems	9
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets	9
Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes	8
Bayesian privacy	8
Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries, and competing paths of diffusion in networks	8
Information design in multistage games	8
Persuasion with unknown beliefs	8
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	8
Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions	8
When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?	7

Deep and shallow thinking in the long run	7
Communication with forgetful liars	7
Agendas in legislative decision‐making	6
Revenue from matching platforms	6
Sufficientarianism	6
Which misspecifications persist?	6
Family ties: School assignment with siblings	6
Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment	6
Rational bubbles and middlemen	6
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations	6
Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents	6
Slow persuasion	6
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning	6
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	6
Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima	5
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification	5
Macro‐financial volatility under dispersed information	5
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	5
Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games	5
Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents	5
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions	5
Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs	5
Random ambiguity	5
Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications	5
On selecting the right agent	5
Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation, and stochastic choice	5
Delegating learning	5
Long information design	5
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	4
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule	4
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers	4
Cooperative strategic games	4
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs	4
A maximum likelihood approach to combining forecasts	4
Monitoring experts	4
Unrestricted information acquisition	4
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	4
Statistical sunspots	4
Chain stability in trading networks	4
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	4
Optimal sequential contests	4
Sustainable debt	4
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	4
Strategic investment evaluation	3
Incomplete‐information games in large populations with anonymity	3
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	3
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions	3
Termination as an incentive device	3
Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy	3
Malthusian stagnation is efficient	3

Optimal allocations with α‐MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and prospect theory	3
Collective hold‐up	3
Value‐based distance between information structures	3
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: The general equilibrium perspective	3
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization	3
Interview hoarding	3
Informed intermediaries	3
Evolution, heritable risk, and skewness loving	3
Bounds on price‐setting	3
Pair‐efficient reallocation of indivisible objects	3
The implementation of stabilization policy	3
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes	3
Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk	3
When Walras meets Vickrey	3
A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation‐based tâtonnement	3
Two‐stage majoritarian choice	3
Simple bets to elicit private signals	2
Stability in repeated matching markets	2
Information aggregation in Poisson elections	2
Asset bubbles and product market competition	2
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	2
Generalized compensation principle	2
Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement	2
Multilevel marketing: Pyramid‐shaped schemes or exploitative scams?	2
Loss aversion in sequential auctions	2
Bargaining with evolving private information	2
Voting in corporations	2
Equilibrium existence in games with ties	2
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	2
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization	2
Robust group strategy‐proofness	2
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	2
Conveying value via categories	2
Bayesian comparative statics	2
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	2
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly	1
Attack and interception in networks	1
Choosing what to pay attention to	1
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	1
The Dynamics of Instability	1
On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules	1
Existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation in stochastic dynamic programming	1
Progressive participation	1
Payoff implications of incentive contracting	1
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification	1
The implications of finite‐order reasoning	1
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes	1
Paying with information	1
Approval voting without ballot restrictions	1
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness	1
Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers	1
Exploiting social influence in networks	1
Asymptotic synthesis of contingent claims with controlled risk in a sequence of discrete‐time markets	1
Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals	1
Equilibrium in a civilized jungle	1
On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks	1
A dynamic model of censorship	1
Digital currency and privacy	1
Relational enforcement	1
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game	1
Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions	1
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof	1
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers	1
The winner‐take‐all dilemma	1
Informative tests in signaling environments	1