Theoretical Economics

Papers
(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 2. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-01-01 to 2026-01-01.)
ArticleCitations
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 326
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 326
Informed intermediaries25
On the limitations of data‐based price discrimination23
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing22
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting19
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 417
Correction to “Incentive‐compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs”15
Ex post approaches to prioritarianism and sufficientarianism15
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models15
Competitive and revenue‐optimal pricing with budgets13
Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament13
The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning12
Choosing what to pay attention to12
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating12
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 412
Data and incentives12
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 111
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 211
Forward‐looking experimentation of correlated alternatives11
Paying with information10
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade10
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation10
Unified gross substitutes and inverse isotonicity for equilibrium problems10
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 49
How to sell in a sequential auction market9
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings9
What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test9
Value‐based distance between information structures9
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs8
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 28
An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money8
Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences8
Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions8
Adoption epidemics and viral marketing8
Weight‐ranked divide‐and‐conquer contracts8
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 37
Statistical sunspots7
When Walras meets Vickrey7
Progressive participation7
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets7
Asset bubbles and product market competition7
Stable matching: An integer programming approach7
Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 46
Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers6
Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game6
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 26
Unrestricted information acquisition6
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 46
Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers5
“Calibeating”: Beating forecasters at their own game5
Subjective information choice processes5
Games with switching costs and endogenous references5
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion5
Optimal sequential contests5
To infinity and beyond: A general framework for scaling economic theories5
Boundedly rational demand5
Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes4
Experimentation in organizations4
Attack and interception in networks4
Tâtonnement in matching markets4
Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public4
Screening for breakthroughs4
Sensitivity versus size: Implications for tax competition4
Pervasive signaling4
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 24
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 34
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness4
Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability4
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state4
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard4
Conveying value via categories4
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors4
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 23
Interview hoarding3
Random utility coordination games on networks3
Rational bubbles and middlemen3
Stability in repeated matching markets3
Robust contracting under double moral hazard3
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 17 Iss. 33
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 20 Iss. 23
Existence of monotone equilibria in large double auctions3
Bargaining with evolving private information3
∀ or ∃?3
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions3
Correlated choice3
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling3
Bayesian social aggregation with almost‐objective uncertainty3
Efficient and strategy‐proof mechanism under general constraints3
Long information design3
Slow persuasion3
Gradual learning from incremental actions3
Frontmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 19 Iss. 13
Efficient incentives with social preferences2
Queueing to learn2
Bayesian comparative statics2
Equilibrium existence in games with ties2
Persuasion with unknown beliefs2
Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack2
Innovation, firm size distribution, and gains from trade2
Exploiting social influence in networks2
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs2
Backmatter of Theoretical Economics Vol. 18 Iss. 32
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets2
Time‐consistent fair social choice2
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions2
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule2
Two‐stage majoritarian choice2
In the shadow of shadow banking: A liquidity perspective2
Optimal allocations with α‐MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and prospect theory2
Stochastic impatience and the separation of time and risk preferences2
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly2
Strategic investment evaluation2
Dynamically stable matching2
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium2
Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information2
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