OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Theoretical Economics is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-03-01 to 2024-03-01.)

Article	Citations
Costly miscalibration	22
Sequential persuasion	21
A model of weighted network formation	16
Convergence in models of misspecified learning	13
A general analysis of boundedly rational learning in social networks	11
Bounded rationality and limited data sets	11
Information aggregation in competitive markets	11
Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard	11
Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility	10
Censorship as optimal persuasion	10
Relational communication	9
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance	9
Experimentation in organizations	9
Dynamically stable matching	8
Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions	8
Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets	8
Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems	7
Persuasion with unknown beliefs	7
Trust and betrayals: Reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment	6
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling	6
Communication with forgetful liars	6
Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes	6
Bayesian privacy	6
Bottleneck links, essential intermediaries, and competing paths of diffusion in networks	6
Transparency and collateral: Central versus bilateral clearing	6

Agendas in legislative decision‐making	5
Deep and shallow thinking in the long run	5
Rational bubbles and middlemen	5
On selecting the right agent	5
Macro‐financial volatility under dispersed information	5
Long information design	5
Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications	5
Equilibrium securitization with diverse beliefs	5
Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games	4
Optimal information structures in bilateral trade	4
Slow persuasion	4
Sustainable debt	4
Monologues, dialogues, and common priors	4
Revenue from matching platforms	4
The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions	4
Robust contracting under double moral hazard	4
(Bad) reputation in relational contracting	4
Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations	4
Chain stability in trading networks	4
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers	4
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning	4
Statistical sunspots	4
Two‐stage majoritarian choice	3
When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?	3
The implementation of stabilization policy	3
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes	3
Unrestricted information acquisition	3
Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy	3
Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets	3
Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima	3
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification	3
Pseudo‐Bayesian updating	3
Informed intermediaries	3
Cooperative strategic games	3
Evolution, heritable risk, and skewness loving	3
Malthusian stagnation is efficient	3
Monitoring experts	3
Delegating learning	3
Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation, and stochastic choice	3
Which misspecifications persist?	3
Random ambiguity	3
Voting in corporations	2
Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization	2
A maximum likelihood approach to combining forecasts	2
Optimal organ allocation policy under blood‐type barriers with the donor‐priority rule	2
Bounds on price‐setting	2
Incomplete‐information games in large populations with anonymity	2
Games with switching costs and endogenous references	2
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions	2
When Walras meets Vickrey	2

Termination as an incentive device	2
Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness	2
Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents	2
Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization	2
Value‐based distance between information structures	2
Information design in multistage games	2
Information aggregation in Poisson elections	2
Family ties: School assignment with siblings	2
Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk	2
Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents	2
Bayesian comparative statics	2
Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement	2
Simple bets to elicit private signals	2
Sufficientarianism	2
A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation‐based tâtonnement	2
Interview hoarding	1
Progressive participation	1
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs	1
Informative tests in signaling environments	1
The implications of finite‐order reasoning	1
Collective hold‐up	1
A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation	1
Robust sequential search	1
Robust group strategy‐proofness	1
The limits of ex post implementation without transfers	1
Stable matching: An integer programming approach	1
Optimal allocations with α‐MaxMin utilities, Choquet expected utilities, and prospect theory	1
Equilibrium in a civilized jungle	1
Dynamic delegation with a persistent state	1
Strategic investment evaluation	1
Paying with information	1
Approval voting without ballot restrictions	1
Optimal sequential contests	1
Loss aversion in sequential auctions	1
Asymptotic synthesis of contingent claims with controlled risk in a sequence of discrete‐time markets	1
Payoff implications of incentive contracting	1
Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly	1
Equilibrium existence in games with ties	1
On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings	1
Choosing what to pay attention to	1
On the neutrality of socially responsible investing: The general equilibrium perspective	1
Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers	1