OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The median citation count of Philosophical Issues is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-11-01 to 2024-11-01.)

Article	Citations
Trust as performance	6
Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding	5
Group agential epistemic injustice: Epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of group epistemic agency¹	5
Responsibility in epistemic collaborations: Is it me, is it the group or are we all to blame?	5
Group evidence	4
Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited	4
On the independence of belief and credence	4
Grounding legal proof	3
Skepticism, naturalism, pyrrhonism	3
Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist	3
Public artifacts and the epistemology of collective material testimony	3
Collective practical knowledge is a fragmented interrogative capacity	2
Belief as emotion	2
Pragmatic encroachment and legal proof	2
Proof Paradoxes, Agency, and Stereotyping	2
Scaffolding knowledge	2
Toward a normative theory of parole grounded in agency	2
Radical internalism	2
Adaptive abilities	1
Norms of criminal conviction	1
Practical understanding	1
Rethinking the wrong of rape¹	1
Why history matters for moral responsibility: Evaluating history‐sensitive structuralism	1
Justification, excuse, and proof beyond reasonable doubt	1
Towards an epistemology of cultural learning	1

Valuable and pernicious collective intellectual self‐trust¹	1
Outlaw epistemologies: Resisting the viciousness of country music's settler ignorance	1
Issue Information	1
Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence	1
Epistemic ambivalence in law	1
Emotions and the phenomenal grasping of epistemic blameworthiness	1
Structural encroachment	0
Blaming the victim	0
Knowing failably and Moorean assertions	0
	0
Determination from Above	0
Epistemic control without voluntarism	0
List for Epistemology volume	0
The value of incoherence	0
From responsibility to causation: The intransitivity of causation as a case study	0
It would be bad if compatibilism were true; therefore, it isn't	0
Epistemic normativity without epistemic teleology	0
The pragmatist school in analytic jurisprudence	0
Doxastic dilemmas and epistemic blame	0
Reasons and belief	0
	0
Free will and self expression: A compatibilist garden of forking paths	0
Reasons‐responsiveness, control and the negligence puzzle	0
Group‐deliberative competences and group knowledge	0
Libertarianism and agentive experience	0
List for Law and Epistemology volume	0
Defeat and proficiencies	0
Standards and values	0
What do we do when we suspend judgement?	0
Zetetic supererogation	0
Non‐ideal epistemic rationality	0
“Free will” is vague	0
Understanding friendship	0
Statistical evidence and incentives in the law	0
	0
Freedom, moral responsibility, and the failure of universal defeat	0
Issue Information	0
Is moral understanding a kind of moral vision?	0
Freedom, foreknowledge, and betting	0
The limits of experience: Dogmatism and moral epistemology	0
Issue Information	0
Subjectivism and the morally conscientious person's concern to avoid acting wrongly	0
Freedom of thought	0
A probabilistic analysis of cross‐examination using Bayesian networks	0
Higher‐order omissions and the stacked view of agency	0
Responsibility and iterated knowledge	0
The state's right to evidence and duties of citizenship	0
Flickering the W‐Defense	0
Eleven angry men	0
Challenging the ability intuition: From personal to extended to distributed belief‐forming processes	0

	0
Gratitude and believing in someone	0
Why group mental states are not exhaustively determined by member states	0
I didn't think of that	0
Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1	0
Epistemic institutions: A joint epistemic action‐based account	0
Socio‐functional foundations in science: The case of measurement	0
Agency and responsibility: The personal and the political	0
Moral expertise as skilled practice	0
Being understood	0
A timid response to the consequence argument	0
Unification without pragmatism	0
The relational foundations of epistemic normativity	0
Collective and extended knowledge	0
How emotions grasp value	0
Issue Information	0
Understanding phenomena: From social to collective?	0
A new solution to the problem of luck	0
Realizing the value of public input: Mini‐public consultation on agency rulemaking¹	0
Incompatibilism and the garden of forking paths	0
Political action, epistemic detachment, and the problem of white‐mindedness	0
Epistemic bootstrapping as a failure to use an independent source	0