Philosophical Explorations

Papers
(The median citation count of Philosophical Explorations is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-05-01 to 2025-05-01.)
ArticleCitations
Perceptual metaphysics: the case for composites24
Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions13
Learning to walk and talk (again): what developmental psychology can teach us about online intersubjectivity8
Psychiatric fictionalism and narratives of responsibility6
Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski6
Inner speech: from self-knowledge to the second-person5
Comment on ‘What’s special about “not feeling like oneself”?’5
Empathy as a means to understand people5
Skepticism about reasons for emotions5
What do my problems say about me?4
Simulation trouble and gender trouble4
Empathising in online spaces4
Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)?4
On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action4
Reason and intuition in Aristotle's moral psychology: why he was not a two-system dualist3
Authoritatively avowing your imaginings by self-ascriptively expressing them3
Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity3
Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to (β)3
My Illness, My Self, and I: when self-narratives and illness-narratives clash3
Self-illness ambiguity and anorexia nervosa3
Self-alienation through the loss of heteronomy: the case of bereavement3
Implicit bias: a sin of omission?2
Why are people often rational? Saving the causal theory of action2
‘It was the illness talking’: self-illness ambiguity and metaphors’ functions in mental health narrative2
What is the relationship between grief and narrative?2
Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery2
Journey planning: a cartography of practical reasoning2
Grief, self and narrative2
Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology2
Empirical imperatives in understanding self-related changes2
Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy1
Comparing deterministic agents: A new argument for compatibilism1
Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception1
The norm of reasoning1
Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies1
Self-illness ambiguity, affectivity, and affordances1
Can realists reason with reasons?1
On the immediate mental antecedent of action1
Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency1
On the fittingness of agential evaluations1
Autonomy, enactivism, and psychopathy1
Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible?1
Self-induced moral incapacity, collective responsibility, and attributability1
A moral freedom to which we might aspire1
Uncertainty and the act of making a difficult choice1
Correspondence and dispositional relations1
Dual-process reflective equilibrium: rethinking the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning1
Thomas Reid’s prescient vision of dual process theory1
Free will, determinism, and the right levels of description1
See what I didn’t do there?1
Empathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy0
Difficulty & quality of will: implications for moral ignorance0
An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions0
Then again, what is manipulation? A broader view of a much-maligned concept0
Functional systems as explanatory tools in psychiatry0
Life and meaning0
Are actions bodily movements?0
Self-deception as normative violation0
The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker0
The creativity of emotions0
How would you answer this question? Can dispositional analyses of belief account for first-person authority?0
Self-implant ambiguity? Understanding self-related changes in deep brain stimulation0
Grief, alienation, and the absolute alterity of death0
Narrative, addiction, and three aspects of self-ambiguity0
Bringing transparency to the de se debates0
Why difference-making mental causation does not save free will0
On the non-propositional content of our ordinary intentions0
Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains0
Dimensions of self-illness ambiguity – a clinical and conceptual approach0
Wide computationalism revisited: distributed mechanisms, parsimony and testability0
Know thyself: bipolar disorder and self-concept0
How simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation?0
Deciding: how special is it?0
Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts0
From causation to conscious control0
Let me go and try0
Simulating experiences: unjust credibility deficits without identity prejudices0
Editorial: self-illness ambiguity and narrative identity0
On the importance of breaks: transformative experiences and the process of narration0
Motivating reasons, responses and the Taking Condition0
Action just is knowledge0
The mental in intentional action0
Mental illness, exemption & moral exclusion: the role of interpretative generosity0
‘What it is like to be me’: from paranoia and projection to sympathy and self-knowledge0
Why severe moral transgressions are often difficult to understand0
Empathizing across sensibilities0
What’s special about ‘not feeling like oneself’? A deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity0
Towards a theory of offense0
Luck, fate, and fortune: the tychic properties0
Fixing internalism about perceptual content0
Aesthetic selves as objects of interpersonal understanding0
Blame: What is it good for?0
Let’s not get ahead of ourselves: we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress0
The modularity of the motor system0
How to overcome self-illness ambiguity in addiction: making sense of one’s addiction rather than just rejecting it. A reply to McConnell and Golova0
Unavoidable actions0
‘Empathy and the boundaries of interpersonal understanding’ – introduction0
Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality0
Narrative negotiation of personal identity0
Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’0
A new argument for ‘thinking-as-speaking’0
Extending knowledge-how0
Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology0
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