Philosophical Explorations

Papers
(The median citation count of Philosophical Explorations is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-02-01 to 2025-02-01.)
ArticleCitations
Then again, what is manipulation? A broader view of a much-maligned concept16
Self-implant ambiguity? Understanding self-related changes in deep brain stimulation13
Narrative, addiction, and three aspects of self-ambiguity9
Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to (β)8
Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations6
Self-illness ambiguity and anorexia nervosa5
The mental in intentional action5
Correspondence and dispositional relations5
The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker4
My Illness, My Self, and I: when self-narratives and illness-narratives clash4
Editorial: self-illness ambiguity and narrative identity3
Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity3
Authoritatively avowing your imaginings by self-ascriptively expressing them3
Can realists reason with reasons?3
Self-alienation through the loss of heteronomy: the case of bereavement3
Deontic artifacts. Investigating the normativity of objects3
Grief, alienation, and the absolute alterity of death3
Mental illness, exemption & moral exclusion: the role of interpretative generosity3
How simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation?3
Difficulty & quality of will: implications for moral ignorance3
Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality3
Acting for normative reasons and the correspondence relation2
What is the relationship between grief and narrative?2
Motivating reasons, responses and the Taking Condition2
What’s special about ‘not feeling like oneself’? A deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity2
Against moral judgment. The empirical case for moral abolitionism2
Grief, self and narrative2
Self-control in action and belief2
Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception2
Fixing internalism about perceptual content1
Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains1
Wide computationalism revisited: distributed mechanisms, parsimony and testability1
Luck, fate, and fortune: the tychic properties1
Implicit bias: a sin of omission?1
How would you answer this question? Can dispositional analyses of belief account for first-person authority?1
From causation to conscious control1
‘It was the illness talking’: self-illness ambiguity and metaphors’ functions in mental health narrative1
Deciding: how special is it?1
Simulating experiences: unjust credibility deficits without identity prejudices1
Blame: What is it good for?1
Perceptual metaphysics: the case for composites1
A moral freedom to which we might aspire1
Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology1
Functional systems as explanatory tools in psychiatry1
Why are people often rational? Saving the causal theory of action1
How to overcome self-illness ambiguity in addiction: making sense of one’s addiction rather than just rejecting it. A reply to McConnell and Golova1
On the importance of breaks: transformative experiences and the process of narration1
‘Empathy and the boundaries of interpersonal understanding’ – introduction1
Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions1
Learning to walk and talk (again): what developmental psychology can teach us about online intersubjectivity1
Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery1
Comment on ‘What’s special about “not feeling like oneself”?’0
Self-illness ambiguity, affectivity, and affordances0
Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy0
A new argument for ‘thinking-as-speaking’0
Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’0
‘What it is like to be me’: from paranoia and projection to sympathy and self-knowledge0
Psychiatric fictionalism and narratives of responsibility0
The guise of good reason0
Know thyself: bipolar disorder and self-concept0
Dual-process reflective equilibrium: rethinking the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning0
Bringing transparency to the de se debates0
Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies0
Empathizing across sensibilities0
Complete blockage Frankfurt examples and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities0
Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology0
On the fittingness of agential evaluations0
Unavoidable actions0
Reason and intuition in Aristotle's moral psychology: why he was not a two-system dualist0
Empathising in online spaces0
Skepticism about reasons for emotions0
Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency0
From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation0
What do my problems say about me?0
Let’s not get ahead of ourselves: we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress0
Empathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy0
Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts0
Extending knowledge-how0
An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions0
Empirical imperatives in understanding self-related changes0
Life and meaning0
Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski0
Autonomy, enactivism, and psychopathy0
Dimensions of self-illness ambiguity – a clinical and conceptual approach0
Why severe moral transgressions are often difficult to understand0
The modularity of the motor system0
Why difference-making mental causation does not save free will0
Comparing deterministic agents: A new argument for compatibilism0
On the immediate mental antecedent of action0
Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)?0
Free will, determinism, and the right levels of description0
Uncertainty and the act of making a difficult choice0
Empathy as a means to understand people0
Aesthetic selves as objects of interpersonal understanding0
Towards a theory of offense0
Can morally ignorant agents care enough?0
Simulation trouble and gender trouble0
The norm of reasoning0
Let me go and try0
On the non-propositional content of our ordinary intentions0
What should the sensorimotor enactivist say about dreams?0
Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible?0
On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action0
See what I didn’t do there?0
Are actions bodily movements?0
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