Philosophical Explorations

Papers
(The median citation count of Philosophical Explorations is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-10-01 to 2024-10-01.)
ArticleCitations
Grief, self and narrative16
Deontic artifacts. Investigating the normativity of objects13
What’s special about ‘not feeling like oneself’? A deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity9
The modularity of the motor system8
Against moral judgment. The empirical case for moral abolitionism6
Difficulty & quality of will: implications for moral ignorance5
Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity5
Free will, determinism, and the right levels of description5
Reason and intuition in Aristotle's moral psychology: why he was not a two-system dualist4
Deciding: how special is it?4
Self-alienation through the loss of heteronomy: the case of bereavement3
On the fittingness of agential evaluations3
Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’3
Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery3
Then again, what is manipulation? A broader view of a much-maligned concept3
Skepticism about reasons for emotions3
Autonomy, enactivism, and psychopathy3
Still committed to the normativity of folk psychology3
Self-implant ambiguity? Understanding self-related changes in deep brain stimulation3
Extending knowledge-how3
Dual-process reflective equilibrium: rethinking the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning3
Uncertainty and the act of making a difficult choice2
What should the sensorimotor enactivist say about dreams?2
What is the relationship between grief and narrative?2
Dimensions of self-illness ambiguity – a clinical and conceptual approach2
From causation to conscious control2
How simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation?2
Let me go and try2
Duality of motivation and the guise of the good in Kant’s practical philosophy2
Narrative, addiction, and three aspects of self-ambiguity2
Towards a theory of offense1
Fixing internalism about perceptual content1
Self-control in action and belief1
Can realists reason with reasons?1
Sidgwick and the many guises of the good1
Kant and the “Old formula of the schools”1
The guise of good reason1
Let’s not get ahead of ourselves: we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress1
An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions1
Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions1
Acting for normative reasons and the correspondence relation1
Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to (β)1
The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker1
Comment on ‘What’s special about “not feeling like oneself”?’1
Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy1
Can morally ignorant agents care enough?1
Functional systems as explanatory tools in psychiatry1
On the importance of breaks: transformative experiences and the process of narration1
Grief, alienation, and the absolute alterity of death1
Self-illness ambiguity and anorexia nervosa1
The guise of the good in Leibniz1
Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency1
On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action1
From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation1
Locke on the guise of the good0
Aesthetic selves as objects of interpersonal understanding0
Simulating experiences: unjust credibility deficits without identity prejudices0
On the non-propositional content of our ordinary intentions0
Implicit bias: a sin of omission?0
Empathizing across sensibilities0
Wide computationalism revisited: distributed mechanisms, parsimony and testability0
Why difference-making mental causation does not save free will0
Motivating reasons, responses and the Taking Condition0
Authoritatively avowing your imaginings by self-ascriptively expressing them0
Pluralism about practical reasons and reason explanations0
Psychiatric fictionalism and narratives of responsibility0
Why severe moral transgressions are often difficult to understand0
The mental in intentional action0
Empirical imperatives in understanding self-related changes0
Are actions bodily movements?0
The modern guise of the good0
Comparing deterministic agents: A new argument for compatibilism0
Complete blockage Frankfurt examples and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities0
‘What it is like to be me’: from paranoia and projection to sympathy and self-knowledge0
How to overcome self-illness ambiguity in addiction: making sense of one’s addiction rather than just rejecting it. A reply to McConnell and Golova0
Empathy, extremism, and epistemic autonomy0
How would you answer this question? Can dispositional analyses of belief account for first-person authority?0
Life and meaning0
Spinoza's guise of the good: getting to the bottom of 3p9s0
Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts0
‘Empathy and the boundaries of interpersonal understanding’ – introduction0
On the immediate mental antecedent of action0
Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception0
My Illness, My Self, and I: when self-narratives and illness-narratives clash0
Editorial: self-illness ambiguity and narrative identity0
Empathy as a means to understand people0
See what I didn’t do there?0
Mill’s proof and the guise of the good0
Know thyself: bipolar disorder and self-concept0
A new argument for ‘thinking-as-speaking’0
Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski0
Self-illness ambiguity, affectivity, and affordances0
Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains0
What do my problems say about me?0
Learning to walk and talk (again): what developmental psychology can teach us about online intersubjectivity0
Simulation trouble and gender trouble0
A moral freedom to which we might aspire0
Bringing transparency to the de se debates0
Luck, fate, and fortune: the tychic properties0
Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible?0
Blame: What is it good for?0
Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality0
Mental illness, exemption & moral exclusion: the role of interpretative generosity0
Goodness and motivation0
Correspondence and dispositional relations0
The norm of reasoning0
Unavoidable actions0
Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies0
Empathising in online spaces0
Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology0
Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)?0
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