OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The TQCC of Journal of Public Economic Theory is 2. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-11-01 to 2025-11-01.)

Article	Citations
	18
More competition to alleviate poverty? A general equilibrium model and an empirical study	17
Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective	14
Subnational borrowing and bailouts: When the federal government looks at the votes (differently) and its borrowing matters	13
Assurance payments on the coordination of threshold public goods provision: An experimental investigation	13
Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation	11
Comparative analyses of fiscal sustainability of the budgetary policy rules	10
Optimal Timing in Competition for Advantage: A Two‐Stage Contest	9
Issue Information	9
The double dividend of relative auditing—Theory and experiments on corporate tax enforcement	8
Redistribution with needs	8
Optimal redistributive policies by publicly provided inputs and income taxation	8
Environment, public debt, and epidemics	7
Can corruption encourage clean technology transfer?	7
Just Lindahl Taxation—A Welfarist Solution	7
Issue Information	7
Twin peaks: Expressive externality in group participation	6
On the (robust) ex post stability of constitutions	6
	6
A spatial theory of urban segregation	5
Weak redistribution and certainty equivalent domination	5
Issue Information	5
	5
Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition with unemployment	5
Prospect equality: A force of redistribution	5

Issue Information	5
Issue Information	5
Transmissible diseases, vaccination, and inequality	5
Issue Information	4
Leadership in Public Good Games and Private Information on Own Social Value Orientation	4
Informational roles of pre‐election polls	4
Merger Review Under Asymmetric Information	4
Corrigendum: Heterogeneity, Impatience, and Dynamic Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good	4
Vaccination under pessimistic expectations in clinical trials and immunization campaigns	4
Control and spread of contagion in networks with global effects	4
	4
	4
Carrots and Sticks: Collaboration of Taxation and Subsidies in Contests	4
Sovereign debt, fiscal policy, and macroeconomic instability	4
	4
Fiscal Space and the Supply of Pro‐Government Militias	3
Coalitions Improve the Coordination and Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence	3
Counteracting “the tragedy of the commons” in an imperfect world	3
	3
How to Deal with Exchange Rate Risk in Infrastructure and Other Long‐Lived Projects	3
Capital depreciation allowances, redistributive taxation, and economic growth	3
	3
Profiting From Regulation: The Effects of Emissions Standards on Abatement R&D	3
Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism	3
Asymmetric regulators in polluting mixed oligopolies: Agency problems and second‐mover advantage	3
Unemployment, tax competition, and tax transfer policy	3
Global Carbon Taxation: Analyzing Pollution Effects When Mobile Firms Trade	3
Emission Tax and Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility Under Relative Profit Performance Competition: Committed Versus Time‐Consistent Tax Policies	2
Issue Information	2
Welfare reducing vertical integration in a bilateral monopoly under Nash bargaining	2
Editors' Note	2
Naïve learning as a coordination device in social networks	2
Issue Information	2
Climate Policy Under National Commitments and Global Economic Shocks	2
	2
Social security and longevity risk: An analysis of couples	2
Elimination contests with collusive team players	2
Economies with rights: Efficiency and inequality	2
	2
Dynamic policy in the presence of social norms	2
On the (Ir)Relevance of Discount Factors for Future Allocations of Scarce Resources	2
Social security, bequests, and social comparisons	2
Norms and Efficiency in a Multi‐Group Society: An Online Experiment	2
Complainer's Dilemma	2