Utilitas

Papers
(The median citation count of Utilitas is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-05-01 to 2026-05-01.)
ArticleCitations
Harm-Benefit Analysis for Animal Experiments Is Not Utilitarian10
The Decline of Egoism10
A Letter from the New Editor10
A Philosophical Metabolism Problem: Undermining of Egoistic Reasons10
Garrett Cullity, Concern, Respect, and Cooperation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 326.7
Precious Goods6
Jeanine M. Grenberg, Kant’s Deontological Eudaemonism: The Dutiful Pursuit of Virtue and Happiness (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. xii + 414.4
Family and Moderation in Locke’s State of Nature3
Superiority Discounting Implies the Preposterous Conclusion3
UTI volume 34 issue 4 Cover and Back matter3
Egalitarianism across Generations3
Degrees and Demands3
Christopher Woodard, Taking Utilitarianism Seriously (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xii + 217.3
Troubled Hedonism and Social Justice: Mill and the Epicureans on the Ataraxic Life3
What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects?3
Three Forms of Actualist Direct Consequentialism2
Reply to Jay on Subjective Consequentialism and Deontic Variance2
Roger Crisp, Sacrifice Regained: Morality and Self-Interest in British Moral Philosophy from Hobbes to Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2019), pp. x + 233.2
Michael Quinn, Bentham (Cambridge and Medford: Polity Press, 2022), pp. x + 218.2
A Less Bad Theory of the Procreation Asymmetry and the Non-Identity Problem2
John Stuart Mill's Passage on Pimps and the Limits on Free Speech2
What Is the Point of a Duty of Beneficence? Reevaluating Taurek2
Some Acts Really Harm: A Defense of the Standard Account versus Norcross's Contextualism2
A Thomistic Solution to the Deep Problem for Perfectionism2
The Prospects for ‘Prospect Utilitarianism’2
Rule Consequentialism and Demandingness: The Wrong Solution(s)?1
Tim Mulgan , Philosophy for an Ending World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024), pp. xxxiv + 292.1
The Subjectivity Argument against the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure1
Posthumous Harm and Changing Desires1
How Should Risk and Ambiguity Affect Our Charitable Giving?1
Harm, Failing to Benefit, and the Counterfactual Comparative Account1
In Defence of Pigou–Dalton for Chances1
A Letter from the Editor1
Ben Bramble & James Lenman, Should We Maximize Utility? A Debate about Utilitarianism (Abingdon, Routledge, 2025), pp. xviii + 224.1
Shelly Kagan, Answering Moral Skepticism (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. xiv + 392.1
Sidgwick’s Critique of Deontology: Scrupulous Fairness or Serpent-Windings?1
Reciprocity, Inequality, and Unsuccessful Rescues1
Douglas Portmore, Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xvii + 324.1
Dead Sea Apple Cases of Disappointment1
Bigoted Insults, Harm, and the Intentional Infliction of Pain: A Reply to Bell1
The Disjunctive Repugnant Conclusion1
Trivially Satisfied Desires: A Problem for Desire-Satisfaction Theories of Well-Being1
Absolute Fairness and Weighted Lotteries1
David Boonin, Dead Wrong: The Ethics of Posthumous Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xii + 209.1
Moral Significance and Overpermissiveness1
Helen McCabe, John Stuart Mill, Socialist (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2021), pp. 368.1
Clifford's Consequentialism1
The Worse than Nothing Account of Harm: A Fallen Hero0
Non-Conceptual Normative Pluralism and the Dualism of Practical Reason0
For the Greater Individual and Social Good: Justifying Age-Differentiated Paternalism0
Concurrent Awareness Desire Satisfactionism0
Trade, Piecework, and the Liberty Principle0
The Morality of Creating Lives Not Worth Living: On Boonin's Solution to the Non-Identity Problem0
Intersubstrate Welfare Comparisons: Important, Difficult, and Potentially Tractable0
The Function of Hypocrisy Norms0
We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth0
Richard Yetter Chappell, Darius Meissner, William MacAskill, An Introduction to Utilitarianism. From Theory to Practice (Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 2025), pp. xii + 251.0
Alastair Norcross, Morality by Degrees: Reasons without Demands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. vii + 157.0
The Definition of Consequentialism: A Survey0
How Relationships Mitigate Paternalistic Complaints (When They Do)0
William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist and Toby Ord, Moral Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. viii + 226.0
Classic Hedonism Reconsidered0
Paul Hurley, Against the Tyranny of Outcomes (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024), pp. xv + 1870
The Influence of Ancient Greek Moral Philosophy on Bentham’s Development of the Principle of Utility: “I Had It from Epicurus, from Carneades,…”0
Intergenerational Justice and Freedom from Deprivation0
Jeremy Bentham , Essays on Logic, Ethics, and Universal Grammar, Edited by Philip Schofield (London, UCL Press, 2025), pp. lxxvi + 519.0
Is Piecework a Private Concern? A Reply to Riley0
The Parent Trap: Why Choice-Dependent Moral Theories Fail to Deliver the Asymmetry0
William MacAskill, What We Owe The Future: A Million-Year View (One World Publications, London, 2022), pp. 246.0
Pattern-Based Reasons and Disaster0
Robert Audi and David Philips (eds.), The Moral Philosophy of W.D. Ross: Metaethics, Normative Ethics, Virtue, & Value (Oxford, OUP, 2025), pp. xii + 272.0
Structural Rationality in Desire0
Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti, Siddiqur Osmani, and Mozaffar Qizilbash (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Capability Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. xxii + 718.0
Bentham’s Laws in Principem and his Command Theory: a Critique of Hart’s Criticisms0
The Dual Reason-Giving Force of Welfare: An Exploration0
Josh Milburn, Food, Justice, and Animals: Feeding the World Respectfully (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. 224.0
Felt-Quality Hedonism, Alienation, and the Spirit of Resonance0
Intuition and Kagan's Hierarchicalism0
Michael Pelczar, Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. xiii + 210.0
UTI volume 34 issue 4 Cover and Front matter0
James E. Crimmins, Utilitarianism in the Early American Republic (New York: Routledge, 2022), pp. 280.0
Hidden Desires: A Unified Strategy for Defending the Desire-Satisfaction Theory0
Doing Harm: A Reply to Klocksiem0
Counterfactual Persons and the Argument Against Abortion: Reply to Kulesa0
UTI volume 34 issue 2 Cover and Back matter0
From Contextualism to Contrastivism in Moral Theory0
An Unwelcome Implication for Omnivores?0
Thomas E. Hill Jr., Beyond Duty: Kantian Ideals of Respect, Beneficence, and Appreciation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. xii + 319.0
Ending Print Publication After December 2022 Issue0
Must We Always Pursue Economic Growth?0
Can Vegans Eat Dessert?0
Steve Clarke, Hazem Zohny, and Julian Savulescu (eds.), Rethinking Moral Status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. xvii + 333.0
Robin Attfield, Applied Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2023), pp. vi + 218.0
When a Free Act Costs a Motive: Clearing Consequentialism of Conflict0
Is Norcross Right about Right?0
Hilary Greaves, Jacob Barrett, David Thorstad, Essays on Longtermism: Present Action for the Distant Future (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2025), pp. 6080
Fit and Well-Being0
Indeterminacy in Global Warming: A Supervaluationist Response0
The Sum of Averages: An Egyptology-Proof Average View0
Larry Temkin, Being Good in a World of Need (Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. xxxi + 388.0
M. A. Roberts, The Existence Puzzle: An Introduction to Population Axiology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024), pp. 280.0
Psychological Egoism and Ought-Implies-Can: What Do They Entail?0
Totalism, Animals, and the Repugnant Conclusion0
Of trolleys and self-driving cars: What machine ethicists can and cannot learn from trolleyology0
Compatibilism and Truly Minimal Morality0
Bain's Theory of Moral Judgment and the Development of Mill's Utilitarianism0
UTI volume 34 issue 2 Cover and Front matter0
Harm, Context, Blame, and Significance: A Response to Eggleston, Sinnott-Armstrong, Mason, and Kagan0
Lives, Limbs, and Liver Spots: The Threshold Approach to Limited Aggregation0
Bodily Appearance, Respect for Persons, and Protecting the Vulnerable0
Samuel Scheffler, One Life to Lead: The Mysteries of Time and the Goods of Attachment. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024), pp. xi + 2510
John Peter DiIulio, Completely Free: The Moral and Political Vision of John Stuart Mill (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022), pp. xiii + 305.0
Benatar and Beyond: Rethinking the Consequences of Asymmetry0
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, The Value Gap (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. xv + 215.0
UTI volume 34 issue 3 Cover and Front matter0
Partial Aggregation for Prioritarians0
A Millian Case against Epistemic Arguments for Federalism0
The Sequence Argument Against the Procreation Asymmetry0
Jeff Sebo, Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves: Why Animals Matter for Pandemics, Climate Change, and Other Catastrophes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. xvii + 255.0
Jonathan Pugh, Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 287.0
The Good and the Wrong of Hypocritical Blaming0
Does the Patterned View Avoid the Ideal Worlds Objection?0
Mark Fabian, A Theory of Subjective Wellbeing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. x + 305.0
Climate Esoteric Morality and the Problem of Inconsequentialism0
Principle, Pragmatism, and Piecework in On Liberty0
Egyptians, Aliens, and Okies: Against the Sum of Averages0
UTI volume 34 issue 3 Cover and Back matter0
Self-Respect Paternalism0
How Thresholds Matter: On the Bounds and Demands of Justice0
Catia Faria, Animal Ethics in the Wild: Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. ix + 222.0
The Counterfactual Argument Against Abortion0
Bentham's Mugging0
Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires0
Better Never to Have Been, Better to Cease to Be?0
0.059792041778564