Games and Economic Behavior

Article	Citations
Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games	63
Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions	51
Policy gambles and valence in elections	34
Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance	32
Beyond uncertainty aversion	24
Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses	23
Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers	21
Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs	20
Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation	19
Editorial Board	19
Continuous level-k mechanism design	19
Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality	16
Mechanism design with informational punishment	15
Grouping agents with persistent types	14
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence	14
Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value	13
Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets	13
Success functions in large contests	13
Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms	13
Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market	12
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles	12
Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics	12
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites	12
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information	12
On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design	11

Editorial Board	11
The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game	11
Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria	11
No trade under verifiable information	11
Partial credence goods on review platforms	10
Editorial Board	10
Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games	10
Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments	10
Editorial Board	10
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players	10
Communication between unbiased agents	10
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency	10
Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence	10
Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation	9
Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies	9
Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction	9
Belief formation under signal correlation	9
Efficient matching under general constraints	8
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis	8
A theory of progressive lending	8
Unfounded opinion's curse	8
Information flows and memory in games	8
Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints	8
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design	8
Social image, observer identity, and crowding up	8
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information	8
Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information	8
Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance	8
Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms	8
Partnerships based on Joint Ownership	7
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments	7
Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition	7
The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study	7
Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result	7
Pricing and information acquisition in networks	7
Social learning among opinion leaders	7
Competition with list prices	7
Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach	7
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting	7
A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains	7
Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games	7
Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report	7
The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma	7
Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs	7
Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information	7
Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior	7
Learning in unprofitable games	7
Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms	7
Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement	7
Extensive form games with incentive stage-bidding: An emergence of non-cooperative cooperation	7

Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks	7
Competitive information disclosure in random search markets	6
On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games	6
Editorial Board	6
Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness	6
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information	6
Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences	6
Editorial Board	6
Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks	6
Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains	6
Aggregating inconclusive data sets	6
Reputation-based persuasion platforms	6
Adverse selection and contingent reasoning in preadolescents and teenagers	6
Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information	6
Strategic ambiguity in global games	6
Editorial Board	6
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values	6
Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation	6
Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma	6
Stable constitutions	5
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time	5
Polarizing persuasion	5
Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty	5
Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment	5
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings	5
Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment	5
Revealed preference domains from random choice	5
Gradual matching with affirmative action	5
Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment	5
Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores	5
Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies	5
On the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism	5
Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors	5
On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust	5
Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing	5
Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences	5
Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma	5
A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs	5
Minimal stable voting rules	5
Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result	5
The secretary recommendation problem	5
Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers	5
Inefficiency in a frictionless market	5
Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice	5
Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games	5
Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices	5
Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making	5
Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice	4
Signaling motives in lying games	4
Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching	4
Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources	4
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule	4
Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game	4
Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation	4
Editorial Board	4
Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries	4
Bargaining with binary private information	4
School choice with transferable student characteristics	4
Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes	4
Contracting with heterogeneous researchers	4
Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values	4
Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy	4
The topology of poker	4
Propaganda and conflict	4
Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace	4
Buying winners	4
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules	4
Bad reputation with simple rating systems	4
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment	4
Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections	4
Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance	4
Learning in networks with idiosyncratic agents	4
Ideological consistency and valence	4
Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results	4
Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints	4
An observability paradox in linked enforcement	4
Towards data auctions with externalities	4
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion	4
Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity	4
Identity change and economic mobility: Experimental evidence	4

Editorial Board	4
Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests	4
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism	4
Evolution and the ultimatum game	4
Local public good equilibrium	4
Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence	4
Editorial Board	4
Optimal attention management: A tractable framework	4
On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality	4
Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections	4
Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems	4
Editorial Board	4
Issue linkage	4
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform	4
Editorial Board	4