Games and Economic Behavior

Papers
(The TQCC of Games and Economic Behavior is 4. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2022-08-01 to 2026-08-01.)
ArticleCitations
Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games65
Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions53
Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance26
Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation24
Continuous level-k mechanism design23
Editorial Board22
Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality22
Grouping agents with persistent types20
Success functions in large contests19
Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria16
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information16
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles15
Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs14
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites14
Mechanism design with informational punishment13
Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers13
Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses13
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence13
Beyond uncertainty aversion13
Fisher markets with linear constraints: Equilibrium properties and efficient distributed algorithms13
Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics12
Policy gambles and valence in elections12
Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market12
No trade under verifiable information11
Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies11
The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game11
Editorial Board11
Editorial Board11
Belief formation under signal correlation11
Editorial Board11
Communication between unbiased agents10
Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments10
Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency10
Partial credence goods on review platforms10
Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games9
Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation9
Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence9
Efficient equilibrium in submodular global games of entry9
Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction9
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players9
Information flows and memory in games9
Authority measure for opinion dynamics8
Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior8
Social image, observer identity, and crowding up8
Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information8
Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints8
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis8
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information8
A theory of progressive lending8
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design7
Efficient matching under general constraints7
A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains7
Partnerships based on Joint Ownership7
Competition with list prices7
Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms7
A simultaneous analysis of turnout and voting under proportional representation: Theory and experiments7
The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study7
Learning in unprofitable games7
Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result7
Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance7
Unfounded opinion's curse7
Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition7
Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information7
Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games7
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting7
Editorial Board6
Competitive information disclosure in random search markets6
Strategic ambiguity in global games6
Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement6
Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report6
Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms6
Neural correlates of interactions between adaptive learning and hierarchical reasoning in repeated strategic games6
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values6
Social learning among opinion leaders6
Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information6
Pricing and information acquisition in networks6
Lucky but confident –The effect of confidence on meritocratic beliefs and preferences for redistribution6
Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs6
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments6
Reputation-based persuasion platforms6
Editorial Board6
The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a discrete ponds dilemma6
Extensive form games with incentive stage-bidding: An emergence of non-cooperative cooperation6
Priority, solidarity, and egalitarianism in the capability approach6
On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust5
On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games5
Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma5
Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers5
Polarizing persuasion5
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time5
Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment5
Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness5
Aggregating inconclusive data sets5
The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings5
Editorial Board5
Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences5
Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment5
Revealed preference domains from random choice5
Cognitive reflection in experimental anchored guessing games5
Minimal stable voting rules5
Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result5
Eliciting and distinguishing between weak and incomplete preferences: Theory, experiment and computation5
Inefficiency in a frictionless market5
Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing5
Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains5
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information5
Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks5
Potentials in social environments5
A model of participatory persuasion5
Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making5
Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment5
Gradual matching with affirmative action5
On the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism5
Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty5
Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation4
Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values4
Editorial Board4
Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources4
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule4
Democratic regulation of AI in the workplace4
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism4
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment4
Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform4
Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching4
Issue linkage4
Editorial Board4
Identity change and economic mobility: Experimental evidence4
Local public good equilibrium4
Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice4
Evaluating non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms: Theory and experiment4
Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores4
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion4
On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality4
Contracting with heterogeneous researchers4
The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests4
Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries4
Propaganda and conflict4
Towards data auctions with externalities4
Ideological consistency and valence4
Bargaining with binary private information4
Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices4
Buying winners4
Editorial Board4
Learning in networks with idiosyncratic agents4
A note on motivated cognition and discriminatory beliefs4
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules4
The case for lobbying transparency4
The effect of exit rights on cost-based procurement contracts4
The topology of poker4
Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints4
Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests4
Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma4
Evolution and the ultimatum game4
An observability paradox in linked enforcement4
Editorial Board4
Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: Experimental evidence4
Bad reputation with simple rating systems4
Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game4
Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences4
Signaling motives in lying games4
Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance4
Editorial Board4
Borda rule and arrow's independence condition in finite societies4
Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity4
Stable constitutions4
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