Review of Industrial Organization

Papers
(The median citation count of Review of Industrial Organization is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-11-01 to 2024-11-01.)
ArticleCitations
Mergers with Differentiated Products: Where Do We Stand?14
Evaluating the Evidence on Vertical Mergers14
When Vertical is Horizontal: How Vertical Mergers Lead to Increases in “Effective Concentration”13
Judicial Response to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines13
Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers11
Hybrid Marketplaces with Free Entry of Sellers11
Presumptions in Vertical Mergers: The Role of Evidence8
Vertical Mergers and Input Foreclosure Lessons from the AT&T/Time Warner Case7
Patent Licensing and Capacity in a Cournot Model6
Economics at the FTC: Fertilizer, Consumer Complaints, and Private Label Cereal6
Doubling Back on Double Marginalization6
Effects of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines on Merger Review: Based on Ten Years of Practical Experience6
Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, and Criminalization5
Economics at the FCC 2020–21: Closing the Connectivity Gap, COVID-19 and Telehealth, Spectrum Auctions, Communications Marketplace Report, and Economic Research5
The Handmade Effect: A Model of Conscious Shopping in an Industrialised Economy5
Supply Chain Innovations and Partial Ownership5
Input Price Discrimination and Allocation Efficiency5
Ten Years of the 2010 HMG: A Perspective from the Department of Justice4
A Kantian Analysis of Pricing and R & D4
When Do Firms Offer Higher Product Quality? Evidence from the Allocation of Inflight Amenities4
The Price Effects of Competition from Parallel Imports and Therapeutic Alternatives: Using Dynamic Models to Estimate the Causal Effect on the Extensive and Intensive Margins4
Recall and Vehicle Characteristics Associated with Vehicle Repair Rates4
Characteristics of Prosecuted Cartels and Cartel Enforcement in South Africa4
Integrating Africa by Competition and Market Policy4
Simulating Vertical Mergers4
Successive Monopoly, Bilateral Monopoly and Vertical Mergers4
Location-Price Equilibria when Traditional Retailers Compete Against an Online Retailer4
Measuring the Power of Regulatory Regimes4
Targeted Value-Enhancing Advertising and Price Competition3
Competition Makes Inspectors More Lenient: Evidence from the Motor Vehicle Inspection Market3
Partial Privatization Upstream with Spatial Price Discrimination Downstream3
Competition and Regulation of Mobile Money Platforms in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya and Uganda3
Competition and Fan Substitution Between Professional Sports Leagues3
Diagnosing Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical Integration by Multiproduct Firms3
The 2010 HMGs Ten Years Later: Where Do We Go From Here?3
The New Vertical Merger Guidelines: Muddying the Waters3
Differentiated Entry or “Me-Too” Entry in Bertrand and Cournot Oligopoly3
Licensing of a New Product Innovation with Risk Averse Agents3
The Expansion of Incentive (Performance-Based) Regulation of Electricity Distribution and Transmission in the United States3
Regulatory Learning in the Face of Net Zero Climate Policy: The Case of the UK3
Renegotiations and Renewals of Public Contracts3
Has Anheuser-Busch Let the Steam Out of Craft Beer? The Economics of Acquiring Craft Brewers3
Pricing Strategies and Partial Privatization Policy3
Consumer Use of Multiple Payment Methods3
The 2023 Merger Guidelines and Market Definition: Doubling Down or Folding?3
Vertical Merger Policy: Special Considerations in Regulated Industries3
Balancing Attraction and Risk Revelation: The Optimal Reservation Price in Peer-to-Peer Loan Auctions2
Reverse Privatization as a Reaction to the Competitive Environment: Evidence from Solid Waste Collection in Germany2
A Canadian Perspective on Vertical Merger Policy and Guidelines2
Retail Markups and Discount-Store Entry2
Non-competition Goals and Their Impact on South African Merger Control: An Empirical Analysis2
The Welfare Effects of Licensing Product-Differentiating Technology in a Commodity Market2
Potential Competition and the 2023 Merger Guidelines2
Spatial Competition Models in Health Care Markets: A Review2
Optimal Incentives for Patent Challenges in the Pharmaceutical Industry2
Loving What You Get: The Price Effects of Consumer Self-Persuasion2
Economics at the FCC 2021–22: 5G Spectrum Auctions, Affordable Connectivity, Broadband Data Collection, and Merger Review2
Evolution of the Merger Guidelines: Is This Fox Too Clever by Half?2
The Upstream Pass-Through Rate, Bargaining Power and the Magnitude of the Raising Rivals’ Costs (RRC) Effect2
Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion2
An Econometric Analysis of the Brazilian Merger Policy2
Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies2
Big Bids and Bidder Behavior in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Peer-to-Peer Loan Markets2
Recent Developments at the CMA: 2021–222
Natural Oligopoly Responses, Repeated Games, and Coordinated Effects in Merger Analysis: A Perspective and Research Agenda2
Competitive Harm from Vertical Mergers2
Price Regulation and Fraud—with Special Emphasis on Gasoline Retailing2
The 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Post-Chicago and Neo-Brandeisian Integration2
Experience Goods, Umbrella Branding, and Reputation2
Environmental Policy as a De Facto Industrial Policy: Evidence from the Japanese Car Market2
Spatial Procurement of Farm Products and the Supply of Processed Foods: Application to the Tomato Processing Industry1
Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2020/20211
Consolidation and Concentration in U.S. Meat Processing: Updated Measures Using Plant-Level Data1
What can be Expected from Mergers After Deregulation? The Case of the Long-Distance Bus Industry in France1
Corporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future1
The 2023 Merger Guidelines: Law, Fact, and Method1
The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2022–20231
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at Ten: A View from the FTC’s Bureau of Economics1
The Timing of Technology Adoption in Network Industries1
Deregulation, Entry, and Competition in Local Banking Markets1
Structural Presumptions for Non-horizontal Mergers in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Primer and a Path Forward1
A Note on Input Price Discrimination Under Bertrand Competition: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Contracting1
Price-Directed Search, Product Differentiation and Competition1
Public–Private Collusion1
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines After 10 Years1
Vertical Mergers in a Model of Upstream Monopoly and Incomplete Information1
Ringleader Discrimination in Leniency Policies1
Illumina-GRAIL in Retrospect1
The 2023 Merger Guidelines and The Role of Economics1
Economics at the FTC: Estimating Harm from Deception and Analyzing Mergers1
Before Privatization There was Its Impact: Sugar Factories in Turkey1
Cartel Penalties Under Endogenous Detection1
The Welfare Effects of Vertical Mergers and their Remedies1
The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines1
The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2019–20201
Incentive Regulation From the Inside: Resetting 12 RPI-X Price Caps in 1993–19951
Getting Merger Guidelines Right1
Two-Period Duopolies with Forward Markets1
The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2020–20211
Effects of Policy Reforms on Firm Innovation1
How do Everyday-Low-Price Supermarkets Adjust Their Prices?1
A Counterfactual Analysis of Amazon’s Acquisitions Under the 2023 Merger Guidelines1
Separating Vertical from Horizontal Differentiation1
Is Divestiture Effective as a Merger Remedy in the U.S. Beer Industry?1
Hotelling’s Model with Firms Located Close to Each Other1
Unilateral Effects of Mergers that Enhance Product Quality1
Local Competition, Multimarket Contact, and Product Quality: Evidence From Internet Service Provision1
Mergers in Declining Industry1
The Effects of Vertical Integration in the Korea Movie Industry: Efficiency Versus Exclusion1
The 2023 Merger Guidelines: A Critical Assessment1
Product Liability and Strategic Delegation: Endogenous Manager Incentives Promote Strict Liability1
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