Mind & Language

Papers
(The TQCC of Mind & Language is 3. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-04-01 to 2025-04-01.)
ArticleCitations
The social epistemology of introspection27
The empirical status of semantic perceptualism21
Are machines radically contextualist?21
Capacitism and the transparency of evidence20
20
Content and phenomenology in The unity of perception19
Perception's objects, border, and epistemic role: Comments on Christopher Hill's Perceptual experience18
Hill on perceptual contents, Thouless properties, and representational pluralism15
Issue Information13
Computation as the boundary of the cognitive13
Issue Information12
Moral rationalism on the brain11
Issue Information10
Hunger, homeostasis, and desire9
9
Why the performance of habit requires attention8
On Mates's puzzle7
The semantics of fiction7
Commitments and the sense of joint agency7
Susanna Schellenberg on perception7
7
First saying, then believing: The pragmatic roots of folk psychology6
How we got stuck: The origins of hierarchy and inequality6
6
How computation explains5
From the epistemic perspectives in experimental semantics to the ambiguity of proper names: Is the inference warranted? A critical notice of Jincai Li's The referential mechanism of proper names5
Further thoughts on hierarchy and inequality5
Group identity and the willful subversion of rationality: A reply to De Cruz and Levy4
Where did real representations go? Commentary on: The concept of representation in the brain sciences: The current status and ways forward by Favela and Machery4
The pragmatic view on dual character concepts and expressions4
Disunity of personal taste4
The innocuousness of folieism and the need of intentionality where transduction fails: Replies to Adger and to Stainton & Viger4
4
Craving for drugs4
Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind4
Learning from presupposition4
The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth4
What is it like to be colour‐blind? A case study in experimental philosophy of experience4
Moving beyond content‐specific computation in artificial neural networks4
In search of the beat4
Issue Information4
Evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy of emotion4
Beyond adverbialism: A new non‐relational theory of perceptual experience3
Pluralism about introspection3
Inference and identity3
In defense of epicycles: Embracing complexity in psychological explanations3
3
Issue Information3
3
Cross‐cultural variation and perspectivalism: Alignment of two red herrings?3
Issue Information3
Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis3
Don't trust Fodor's guide in Monte Carlo: Learning concepts by hypothesis testing without circularity3
Polysemy does not exist, at least not in the relevant sense3
Contextualizing, eliminating, or glossing: What to do with unclear scientific concepts like representation3
Misperceiving properties3
How we talk about smells3
Do emotions represent values and how can we tell?3
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