Social Choice and Welfare

Papers
(The TQCC of Social Choice and Welfare is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-03-01 to 2025-03-01.)
ArticleCitations
The framing of elections: cooperation vs. competition53
Mechanism design with model specification11
Ordinal utility differences10
Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model10
Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes10
Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis10
Correction to: Repugnant conclusions7
On the political economy of economic integration7
Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects6
The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison6
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes5
The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework5
Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians?5
Dynamic choice under familiarity-based attention5
Optimal labor income taxation: the role of the skill distribution5
Escape poverty trap with trust? An experimental study5
Dynamic communication mechanism design4
Collective decision under ignorance4
Families of abstract decision problems whose admissible sets intersect in a singleton4
Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information4
Universalization and altruism4
Moral awareness polarizes people’s fairness judgments4
Fair group decisions via non-deterministic proportional consensus4
Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations4
Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity3
Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty3
Collective or individual rationality in the Nash bargaining solution: efficiency-free characterizations3
Dynamic proportional rankings3
Electoral turnout with divided opposition3
Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare3
Deliberative democracy and utilitarianism3
United for change: deliberative coalition formation to change the status quo3
Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention3
Stable preference aggregation with infinite population3
Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems2
Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based2
Ethnic distribution, effective power and conflict2
The Political Economy of Technocratic Governments2
Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions2
Preference heterogeneity over the aspects of individual well-being: towards the construction of an applied well-being index2
Million dollar questions: why deliberation is more than information pooling2
Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections2
Ties2
Voting equilibria and public funding of political parties2
Fair long-term care insurance2
Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification2
Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley–Shubik power index2
Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains2
Citizen preferences and the architecture of government2
Compromise in combinatorial vote2
Electoral Institutions with impressionable voters2
The average-of-awards rule for claims problems2
Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests2
Centrality measures in networks2
Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation2
Institutional reform, technology adoption and redistribution: a political economy perspective2
Truthful cake sharing1
Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures1
Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the Council of the European Union1
Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems1
Decentralized pure exchange processes on networks1
Habit formation and the pareto-efficient provision of public goods1
Aggregating credences into beliefs: agenda conditions for impossibility results1
Liberal political equality does not imply proportional representation1
The development of egalitarianism: evidence from children and adults in China1
Special Issue on Fair Public Decision Making: Allocating Budgets, Seats, and Probability1
A dynamic model of endogenous development: the role of pioneers1
A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility1
Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences1
The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes1
Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy1
Special Issue in Honour of John A. Weymark1
Premise-based vs conclusion-based collective choice1
Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games1
Fair cake-cutting for imitative agents1
Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice1
Discrete choice under risk and model uncertainty1
Relative measures of economic insecurity1
Consistent social ranking solutions1
Does the approval mechanism induce the efficient extraction in common pool resource games?1
On efficiency in disagreement economies1
Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river1
Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core1
Where should your daughter go to college? An axiomatic analysis1
Anthony Downs (1930–2021)1
Foundations of utilitarianism under risk and variable population1
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation1
Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents1
Introduction: special issue on deliberation and aggregation1
Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited1
Borda-optimal taxation of labour income1
Selection closedness and scoring correspondences1
When do reforms meet fairness concerns in school admissions?1
The problem of no hands: responsibility voids in collective decisions1
Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals1
Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items1
Random assignments and outside options1
Padding and pruning: gerrymandering under turnout heterogeneity1
Robust dissimilarity comparisons with categorical outcomes1
When the state does not play dice: aggressive audit strategies foster tax compliance1
Information disclosure with many alternatives1
The largest Condorcet domain on 8 alternatives1
Taxation behind the veil of ignorance1
Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern1
From Condorcet’s paradox to Arrow: yet another simple proof of the impossibility theorem1
Preference aggregation for couples1
Poisson voting games under proportional rule1
Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence1
Optimal lobbying pricing1
Christian Klamler’s ”A distance measure for choice functions” [Social Choice and Welfare 30 (2008) 419–425]: a correction1
Minimally strategy-proof rank aggregation1
Approval-based shortlisting1
Social insurance against a short life: Ante-Mortem versus post-mortem policies1
Partial-implementation invariance and claims problems1
Correction to: The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework1
Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants1
The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives1
Redistributive politics under ambiguity1
Responsibility utility and the difference between preference and desirance: implications for welfare evaluation1
Repugnant conclusions1
Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in Approval Voting1
On measuring axiom violations due to each tax instrument applied in a real-world personal income tax1
Campaign finance and welfare when contributions are spent on mobilizing voters1
Implementation in strong core by codes of rights1
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