Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Papers
(The median citation count of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2021-05-01 to 2025-05-01.)
ArticleCitations
Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the logic of obligation140
Replies to Critics25
How to be minimalist about shared agency18
Longtermism and aggregation17
Issue Information15
Foundations, Derivations, Applications: Replies to Bykvist, Arpaly, Steele, and Tenenbaum14
Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself*14
Plato’s Moral Psychology (PMP) distinguishes two theses that might be taken as foundational to Plato’s psychologizing13
Risky belief13
Issue Information12
Why better safe than sensitive11
Responding to second‐order reasons10
Précis of Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry#10
Eliminating epistemic rationality#9
Deviating from the ideal9
Sensible individuation8
Autonomy and aesthetic valuing8
Is the Universe Indifferent? Should We Care8
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons8
Suffering as significantly disrupted agency7
Representation and rationality7
Is Kant's critique of metaphysics obsolete?7
Treating people as individuals and as members of groups7
On proper presupposition6
Epistemic advantage on the margin: A network standpoint Epistemology6
Notes on A Spirit of Trust6
Languages and language use6
States of affairs and our connection with the good5
Language and representationalism15
The do‐able solution to the interface problem5
On the diverse priorities of autonomous women5
Issue Information5
Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment5
Replies to Leite, Shaw, and Campbell4
Replies to Cruft, Radzik, and Misak4
Issue Information4
Precis of The Exchange of Words4
Entitlement and misleading evidence4
Psychological eudaimonism and the natural desire for the good: Comments on Rachana Kamtekar's Plato's Moral Psychology4
On Margaret Gilbert's Rights and Demands4
Arguments philosophical and political4
What Do Easy Inferences Get Us?3
Replies to Rosen, Leiter, and Dutilh Novaes3
The duty to listen3
Normality, safety and knowledge3
Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance3
Imagination as a process3
Neopragmatist semantics3
Prudential value and impersonal value3
Abstraction and grounding3
Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence)3
Meta‐Skepticism3
Expressivism, Inferentialism and the Simulation Game3
Desert of blame2
Structuring Wellbeing*2
The aim of inquiry?2
Number nativism12
Nietzschean Autonomy and the Meaning of the “Sovereign Individual”*2
Creativity as a higher agency2
2
2
The epistemic role of consciousness2
Counterfactual skepticism is (just) skepticism2
Metaphysics Avoidance: Mark Wilson and Ernst Cassirer*2
Issue Information2
Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal2
Recalibrating evolutionary debunking2
Intention Persistence2
Replies to Lear, Meyer and Vasiliou2
Death and existential value: In defence of Epicurus2
Living with absurdity: A Nobleman's guide2
Will intelligent machines become moral patients?2
Determinism, deliberation, and responsibility2
Animal nature within and without: A comment on Korsgaard's Fellow Creatures2
Replies to Critics2
Justification, normalcy and randomness2
Remnants of perception: Comments on Block and the function of visual working memory2
Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization2
The selective advantage of representing correctly2
Time's arrow and self‐locating probability2
Issue Information2
A new well‐being atomism2
Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality's Harmonious Propensity2
Margaret cavendish on passion, pleasure, and propriety1
Humility for Everyone: A No‐Distraction Account1
Save the five: Meeting Taurek's challenge1
Against anti‐fanaticism1
Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism1
Margaret Gilbert on “Rights and Demands”1
Third‐personal evidence for perceptual confidence1
Whose public reason? Which reasonableness?1
Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account1
Inquiry for the mistaken and confused1
Demoralizing Recognition1
Noncognitivism without expressivism1
Are there subintentional actions?1
Issue Information1
A sensible experientialism?1
Pain without inference1
On behalf of the moral realist1
Shame & Guilt: From Deigh to Strawson & Hume, and now to the Stoics1
Judging for ourselves1
1
Fair equality of opportunity and the gendered division of labor1
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe1
Heidegger's argument for fascism1
Inquiry beyond knowledge1
Replies to Sherman, Nussbaum, and Berman1
Increasing the risk that someone will die without increasing the risk that you will kill them1
Issue Information1
What is social organizing?1
Slurring silences1
Response to Neander's Critics1
Issue Information1
Précis of articulating the moral community1
Marcus on self‐conscious knowledge of belief1
Good Guesses1
Emotion, attention, and reason1
Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology1
Practical Wisdom, Well‐Being, and Success1
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism1
The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force1
Issue Information1
Replies to Honneth, McDowell, Pippin, and Stern1
Regulative rules: A distinctive normative kind1
Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons1
Pessimism and procreation1
Richardson on the construction of moral norms1
Two kinds of curiosity1
Telling as Joint Action: comments on Richard Moran’s The Exchange of Words1
Trust and trustworthiness1
Desire and Goodness1
What is conceptual engineering good for? The argument from nameability1
Reference and morphology*1
A modal theory of justification1
Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check11
Internalizing rules1
Two sorts of biological kind terms: The cases of ‘rice’ and ‘Rio de Janeiro Myrtle’1
Intellectual humility without limits: Magnanimous humility, disagreement and the epistemology of resistance1
Parity and Pareto1
Grounding empirical in transcendental reality1
Issue Information1
Pascal's birds: Signs and significance in nature*1
Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology1
Is truth inconsistent?1
Can rules ground moral obligations?1
Knowing to infinity: Full knowledge and the margin‐for‐error principle1
Is identity non‐contingent?1
Beliefs as dispositions to make judgments1
1
A causal modeler's guide to double effect reasoning1
Comments on Rachana Kamtekar, Plato’s Moral Psychology1
Ground and Grain0
On Sarah McGrath's Moral Knowledge0
Regions, extensions, distances, diameters0
Decision, causality, and predetermination0
Précis of fellow creatures: Our obligations to the other animals0
Iconicity, 2nd‐order isomorphism, and perceptual categorization0
De se names0
Hume's skeptical philosophy and the moderation of pride0
Replies to Feldman, Greco, and Malmgren0
Précis of A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology0
Issue Information0
Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference0
Proper names as counterpart‐theoretic individual concepts0
0
Nietzsche on art as the good will to appearance0
Love First0
Locke's Aristotelian theory of quantity0
Moral knowledge precis0
0
How to make up your mind0
Comparative opinion loss0
What the golden rule teaches us about ethics0
Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry0
Theories of perceptual content and cases of reliable spatial misperception0
On penance0
Legal Rights and Joint Commitment0
The Unity of Normative Thought0
On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs0
Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?0
Aggregation Without Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being0
Engineering social concepts: Feasibility and causal models0
The identity of what? Pluralism, practical interests, and individuation0
Welfare and autonomy under risk0
The Dworkin–Williams debate: Liberty, conceptual integrity, and tragic conflict in politics0
Forever fitting feelings0
Précis of Seeing and Saying0
Intentional objects and experience ―Response to my critics0
Responses to Darwall, Watson, Arneson, and Helmreich0
Freedom first: On coercion and coercive offers0
Why So Serious? The Nature and Value of Play*0
Indirect evaluative voluntarism0
Realism Without Rigidity?0
Principles of Proportionate Punishment: Comments on John Deigh, From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism0
Dependent reliability: Why And How Conditional Reliability Should Be Replaced By It0
The unity of knowledge0
Standing up for supervenience0
Absence and objectivity0
0
Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: A moderate separatist account0
0
Why prevent human extinction?0
Agnostic Wrongs and Pragmatic Disencroachment0
0
Illusory world skepticism0
0
Let's hope we're not living in a simulation0
The sources of moral knowledge0
Marcus on forms of judgment and the theoretical orientation of the mind0
Issue Information0
0
Sakes exist0
The Euthyphro challenge in metasemantics0
Taking the simulation hypothesis seriously0
Just Words: Intentions, Tolerance and Lexical Selection*0
Between perception and thought0
Dialetheism and the countermodel problem0
Précis of From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism10
Valuing animals, nature, and our own animal nature: A reply to Maclean, Schapiro, and Wallace0
Seeing or Saying?0
Personal ideals and the ideal of rational agency10
Moral equality and social hierarchy0
Comments on Cullity0
0
Of seeming disagreement0
Of Witches and White Folks*0
Cullity on The Foundations of Morality0
When the Concrete is Hard0
Expressivism and moral independence0
Précis of The Border between Seeing and Thinking0
An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains0
Moral agency under oppression0
Complaints and tournament population ethics0
Attention as selection for action defended0
Better guesses0
Replies to Lawlor, Goldberg, and Pritchard0
Implications of the substantive nature of empirical reason0
Bias, norms, introspection, and the bias blind spot10
Internalist Semantics: Comments on Paul Pietroski, Conjoining Meanings0
Chance, ability, and control0
Classification procedures as the targets of conceptual engineering0
Assurance and Disjunctivism0
In the spirit of Hegel?0
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how0
Issue Information0
Block on perceptual variation, attribution, discrimination, and adaptation0
Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment0
Bilateralism, coherence, and incoherence0
The new evil demon problem at 400
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