Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Papers
(The median citation count of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is 0. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-11-01 to 2024-11-01.)
ArticleCitations
Empathy and the Value of Humane Understanding31
Transparency is Surveillance29
Good Guesses14
On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs14
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe12
Epistemic advantage on the margin: A network standpoint Epistemology12
Classification procedures as the targets of conceptual engineering11
Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance11
Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference11
Ground and Grain10
What Makes Something Surprising?9
Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will9
Thinking and being sure*8
The fragmentation of phenomenal character8
Perception and Probability7
The aim of inquiry?7
Gendered affordance perception and unequal domestic labour7
Group Action Without Group Minds7
Forever fitting feelings6
Trivializing Informational Consequence6
Externalism and exploitability6
The Ineffability of Induction6
Natural goodness without natural history6
The epistemic imagination revisited6
Just Words: Intentions, Tolerance and Lexical Selection*5
Aggregation Without Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being5
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy5
Pragmatic Particularism5
Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking5
Degrees of Assertability5
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how5
Trust and trustworthiness5
Suffering as significantly disrupted agency5
Should the Non‐Classical Logician be Embarrassed?*4
Forgiving, Committing, and Un‐forgiving4
The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism4
Punting on the aesthetic question4
Practical Wisdom, Well‐Being, and Success4
Bias, norms, introspection, and the bias blind spot14
Of Witches and White Folks*4
Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry4
Neopragmatist semantics4
Letting go of blame4
Complaints and tournament population ethics4
Seeing and visual reference3
Desert of blame3
Two kinds of curiosity3
Nietzschean Autonomy and the Meaning of the “Sovereign Individual”*3
The Question of Iterated Causation3
The Shape of the Kantian Mind3
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons3
The Vices of Perception*3
The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively) substantial3
What Do Easy Inferences Get Us?3
In defense of guilt‐tripping3
Humility for Everyone: A No‐Distraction Account3
Pragmatic Skepticism3
Channels for Common Ground3
Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the logic of obligation13
Normativity, Agency, and Value: A view from aesthetics3
An explanationist account of genealogical defeat3
Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism3
Replies to Rosen, Leiter, and Dutilh Novaes2
Inquiry beyond knowledge2
Replies to Honneth, McDowell, Pippin, and Stern2
The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness2
Kolors Without Colors, Representation Without Intentionality2
Will intelligent machines become moral patients?2
Death and existential value: In defence of Epicurus2
Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself*2
Conditionalism, intrinsicalism, and pleasure in the bad2
Demoralizing Recognition2
Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: A moderate separatist account2
Doubts about Duty as a Secondary Motive2
Devoting ourselves to the manifestly unattainable*2
Something is true2
Aesthetic Learners and Underachievers: Symposium on Dom Lopes’s Being for beauty2
Time's arrow and self‐locating probability2
The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term2
Foreknowledge requires determinism2
Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment2
Third‐personal evidence for perceptual confidence2
Gupta has built a magnificent mansion, but can we live in it?2
Why So Serious? The Nature and Value of Play*2
Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment2
Is the Universe Indifferent? Should We Care2
Eliminating epistemic rationality#2
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution2
Is identity non‐contingent?2
Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence)2
Dutch‐booking indicative conditionals1
Autonomy and aesthetic valuing1
Neander on a Mark of the Mental1
Deviating from the ideal1
Realism Without Rigidity?1
Rationality: What difference does it make?1
Living with absurdity: A Nobleman's guide1
Aspiring to be rational1
The selective advantage of representing correctly1
Grounding identity in existence1
Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology1
Marcus on self‐conscious knowledge of belief1
Marcus on forms of judgment and the theoretical orientation of the mind1
The elusive role of normal‐proper function in cognitive science1
Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief1
Replies to Critics1
Doncaster pandas and Caesar's armadillo1
On proper presupposition1
Suffering as experiential—A response to Jennifer Corns1
Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?1
On behalf of the moral realist1
Overthrow the Orthodoxy! Replies to Hill, Titus, and Sosa1
Precis1
Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account1
Reference and morphology*1
Foundationalism and empirical reason: On the rational significance of observation1
Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight1
Metaphysics Avoidance: Mark Wilson and Ernst Cassirer*1
Engineering social concepts: Feasibility and causal models1
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Précis of From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism11
How to be minimalist about shared agency1
Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching1
Mushy Akrasia: Why Mushy Credences Are Rationally Permissible1
Resolving to believe: Kierkegaard's direct doxastic voluntarism1
Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons1
Response to Neander's Critics1
Imagination as a process1
Commonsense morality and contact with value1
Prior's puzzle generalized1
Regulative rules: A distinctive normative kind1
A sensible experientialism?1
Theories of perceptual content and cases of reliable spatial misperception1
A new well‐being atomism1
On anti‐abortion violence1
Overbooking: Permissible when and only when scaled up1
Replies to Lawlor, Goldberg, and Pritchard1
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism1
Some challenges raised by unconscious belief1
The Euthyphro challenge in metasemantics1
Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology1
Moral worth and skillful action1
Semiotics in the head: Thinking about and thinking through symbols1
Ethics without numbers1
Shame & Guilt: From Deigh to Strawson & Hume, and now to the Stoics1
Comment on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception1
The Unity of Normative Thought1
Desire and Goodness1
Smithian sympathy and the emergence of norms1
“All for one and one for all”1
Causal decision theory, context, and determinism1
Contrastive consent and secondary permissibility1
Expertise and Evaluation1
Meta‐Skepticism1
Decision, causality, and predetermination1
Abstraction and grounding1
Procedural chances and the equality of claims1
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De se names0
Ontologically grounding appearances in experience: Transcendental Idealism according to Anja Jauernig's The World According to Kant0
Comments on McGrath0
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Justification, normalcy and randomness0
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The content of indexical belief0
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Cullity on The Foundations of Morality0
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Precis of Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry0
Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization0
Précis of Physics Avoidance0
Accessibilism without consciousness0
Erratum to Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis0
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Plato’s Moral Psychology (PMP) distinguishes two theses that might be taken as foundational to Plato’s psychologizing0
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Standing up for supervenience0
Intention Persistence0
Richardson on moral innovation0
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Inquiry for the mistaken and confused0
An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains0
Précis of Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry#0
Credences for strict conditionals0
Searching for social properties0
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Structuring Wellbeing*0
The relevance of salience for the epistemology of mathematics0
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Hume's skeptical philosophy and the moderation of pride0
Parity and Pareto0
Moral knowledge precis0
Precis of belief, inference, and the self‐conscious mind0
Infinite inference and mathematical conventionalism0
Foundations, Derivations, Applications: Replies to Bykvist, Arpaly, Steele, and Tenenbaum0
Animal nature within and without: A comment on Korsgaard's Fellow Creatures0
Précis of fellow creatures: Our obligations to the other animals0
The distinct moral importance of acting together0
Personal ideals and the ideal of rational agency10
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Save the five: Meeting Taurek's challenge0
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Comment on Gina Schouten0
Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality's Harmonious Propensity0
Recalibrating evolutionary debunking0
The Utility of a Psychoanalytic Theory of Law0
What is social organizing?0
Indirect evaluative voluntarism0
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A new problem for rules0
Determinism, deliberation, and responsibility0
Why better safe than sensitive0
Replies to Critics0
Philosophy's past: Cognitive values and the history of philosophy0
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Replies to Lear, Meyer and Vasiliou0
Epicureans and Stoics on the Rationality of Perception0
Précis: Concern, Respect, and Cooperation0
Sensible individuation0
Faith and rational deference to authority0
Responses to Darwall, Watson, Arneson, and Helmreich0
Number nativism10
Précis: Liberalism, neutrality, and the gendered division of labor0
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Treating people as individuals and as members of groups0
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Risky belief0
Better guesses0
Margaret Gilbert on “Rights and Demands”0
Précis of articulating the moral community0
Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal0
The unity of knowledge0
Two sorts of biological kind terms: The cases of ‘rice’ and ‘Rio de Janeiro Myrtle’0
A Counter‐Reformation0
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Responding to second‐order reasons0
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Counterfactual skepticism is (just) skepticism0
Categorical phenomenalism about sexual orientation*0
Brute ignorance0
Noncognitivism without expressivism0
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