Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Article	Citations
Oppressive Things*	34
There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame	27
Theory of inquiry	22
Empathy and the Value of Humane Understanding	20
Transparency is Surveillance	18
Epistemic advantage on the margin: A network standpoint Epistemology	12
Limits of Abductivism About Logic	12
Aesthetic practices and normativity	12
Good Guesses	11
On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs	10
Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference	10
Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will	9
Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance	9
What Makes Something Surprising?	9
Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types	8
Explanatory Consolidation: From ‘Best’ to ‘Good Enough’	8
Capacities First	7
Ground and Grain	7
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe	6
The fragmentation of phenomenal character	6
Classification procedures as the targets of conceptual engineering	6
The nature of perceptual constancies	6
Perception and Probability	6
The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality*	6
Trivializing Informational Consequence	5

Why I Don’t Believe in Patriarchy: Comments on Kate Manne’s Down Girl	5
Externalism and exploitability	5
Group Action Without Group Minds	5
Forever fitting feelings	5
Aggregation Without Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being	5
Infinite Reasoning	5
Infinite Prospects*	4
Should the Non‐Classical Logician be Embarrassed?*	4
The epistemic imagination revisited	4
Resisting easy inferences1	4
Natural goodness without natural history	4
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy	4
Neopragmatist semantics	4
Thinking and being sure*	4
Pragmatic Particularism	4
The Independence Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism	4
Degrees of Assertability	4
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how	4
Just Words: Intentions, Tolerance and Lexical Selection*	4
The Ineffability of Induction	4
The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self‐Defense	4
What Do Easy Inferences Get Us?	3
An explanationist account of genealogical defeat	3
Self‐Knowledge: Expression without Expressivism	3
Of Witches and White Folks*	3
Suffering as significantly disrupted agency	3
The aim of inquiry?	3
Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the logic of obligation1	3
Practical Wisdom, Well‐Being, and Success	3
The Question of Iterated Causation	3
Trust and trustworthiness	3
Complaints and tournament population ethics	3
The Vices of Perception*	3
Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further	3
Moral demands and the far future*	3
Forgiving, Committing, and Un‐forgiving	3
Knowledge of Objective ‘Oughts’: Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle	3
Forgetting memory skepticism	3
Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking	3
Channels for Common Ground	3
Punting on the aesthetic question	3
Normativity, Agency, and Value: A view from aesthetics	2
Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment	2
Nietzschean Autonomy and the Meaning of the “Sovereign Individual”*	2
From metasemantics to analyticity	2
Demoralizing Recognition	2
Humility for Everyone: A No‐Distraction Account	2
Gendered affordance perception and unequal domestic labour	2
Gender Policing: Comments on Down Girl	2
Is the Universe Indifferent? Should We Care	2

Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself*	2
Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis	2
Précis of The Unity of Perception	2
Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles	2
Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism	2
Bias, norms, introspection, and the bias blind spot1	2
Replies to Honneth, McDowell, Pippin, and Stern	2
Are we all exploiters?*	2
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons	2
The Diversity of Experiences	2
The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively) substantial	2
Jonardon Ganeri’s Transcultural Philosophy of Attention	2
Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence)	2
How Valuable Could a Person Be?*	2
The Shape of the Kantian Mind	2
The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness	2
How Particular Is Perception?	2
Letting go of blame	2
Singular troubles with singleton socrates	2
Will intelligent machines become moral patients?	2
The asymmetry, uncertainty, and the long term	2
“All for one and one for all”	1
Kolors Without Colors, Representation Without Intentionality	1
Shame & Guilt: From Deigh to Strawson & Hume, and now to the Stoics	1
A new well‐being atomism	1
Down Girl Précis	1
Procedural chances and the equality of claims	1
Causal decision theory, context, and determinism	1
Something is true	1
Is identity non‐contingent?	1
Metaphysics Avoidance: Mark Wilson and Ernst Cassirer*	1
Theories of perceptual content and cases of reliable spatial misperception	1
The Sequential Dominance Argument for the Independence Axiom of Expected Utility Theory	1
Epistemic entitlement, epistemic risk and leaching	1
Eliminating epistemic rationality#	1
Neander on a Mark of the Mental	1
Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology	1
Précis of From Psychology to Morality: Essays in Ethical Naturalism1	1
Death and existential value: In defence of Epicurus	1
Devoting ourselves to the manifestly unattainable*	1
Expertise and Evaluation	1
Spinoza on the Limits of Explanation	1
Perceptual Capacities, Success, and Content	1
Desire and Goodness	1
Precis	1
Decision, causality, and predetermination	1
Seeing and visual reference	1
Meta‐Skepticism	1
Norms in Counterfactual Selection	1
Ethics without numbers	1
Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology	1
Third‐personal evidence for perceptual confidence	1
How literature expands your imagination	1
Replies to Lawlor, Goldberg, and Pritchard	1
Living with absurdity: A Nobleman's guide	1
Aspiring to be rational	1
Replies to Critics	1
Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons	1
The elusive role of normal‐proper function in cognitive science	1
Response to Neander's Critics	1
On proper presupposition	1
Prior's puzzle generalized	1
Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment	1
The Right Wrong‐Makers	1
Epistemic probabilities are degrees of support, not degrees of (rational) belief	1
Misogyny and Ideological Logic	1
Semiotics in the head: Thinking about and thinking through symbols	1
Foreknowledge requires determinism	1
Realism Without Rigidity?	1
Why bounded rationality (in epistemology)?	1
Pragmatic Skepticism	1
Comment on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception	1
Overbooking: Permissible when and only when scaled up	1
Replies to Commentators	1
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution	1
Practical knowledge and error in action	1
A Problem for Ganeri’s Buddhaghosa	1
Doubts about Duty as a Secondary Motive	1
Mushy Akrasia: Why Mushy Credences Are Rationally Permissible	1
Sensible individuation	0

The selective advantage of representing correctly	0
Issue Information	0
The distinct moral importance of acting together	0
Personal ideals and the ideal of rational agency1	0
Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization	0
The Arationality of Perception: Comments on Susanna Siegel	0
	0
Issue Information	0
Faith and rational deference to authority	0
Issue Information	0
Issue Information	0
Time's arrow and self‐locating probability	0
Margaret Gilbert on “Rights and Demands”	0
	0
Précis of Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry#	0
Issue Information	0
Issue Information	0
Noncognitivism without expressivism	0
Autonomy and aesthetic valuing	0
Issue Information	0
Too much attention, too little self	0
Structuring Wellbeing*	0
Risky belief	0
Précis of articulating the moral community	0
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	0
The Utility of a Psychoanalytic Theory of Law	0
The Rationality of Perception: Replies to Lord, Railton, and Pautz	0
Replies to Lear, Meyer and Vasiliou	0
The content of indexical belief	0
Two sorts of biological kind terms: The cases of ‘rice’ and ‘Rio de Janeiro Myrtle’	0
Précis: Concern, Respect, and Cooperation	0
Critique of Agnes Callard, Aspiration	0
Deviating from the ideal	0
How to be minimalist about shared agency	0
Précis of fellow creatures: Our obligations to the other animals	0
Précis: Liberalism, neutrality, and the gendered division of labor	0
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	0
What's the coincidence in debunking?	0
Issue Information	0
PPR Symposium on Attention, Not Self	0
Two kinds of curiosity	0
	0
Reference and morphology*	0
	0
Intention Persistence	0
Desert of blame	0
Standing up for supervenience	0
Erratum to Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis	0
The relevance of salience for the epistemology of mathematics	0
Absolutely general knowledge*	0
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism	0
	0
Aesthetic Learners and Underachievers: Symposium on Dom Lopes’s Being for beauty	0
The unity of knowledge	0
Issue Information	0
Richardson on moral innovation	0
Replies	0
Comments on McGrath	0
Philosophy's Past: Cognitive Values and the History of Philosophy	0
Issue Information	0
Issue Information	0
Animal nature within and without: A comment on Korsgaard's Fellow Creatures	0
An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains	0
Suffering as experiential—A response to Jennifer Corns	0
Cullity on The Foundations of Morality	0
Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry	0
Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal	0
Representation and rationality	0
Précis of Physics Avoidance	0
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Issue Information	0
Comments on Cullity	0
Plato’s Moral Psychology (PMP) distinguishes two theses that might be taken as foundational to Plato’s psychologizing	0
Accessibilism without consciousness	0
Issue Information	0
Foundationalism and empirical reason: On the rational significance of observation	0
A Counter‐Reformation	0
Counterfactual skepticism is (just) skepticism	0
Searching for social properties	0
A new problem for rules	0
De SeNames	0
Categorical phenomenalism about sexual orientation*	0
Issue Information	0
Replies to Critics	0
Issue Information	0
Hume's skeptical philosophy and the moderation of pride	0
Comment on Gina Schouten	0
Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality's Harmonious Propensity	0
	0
Moral knowledge precis	0
Epicureans and Stoics on the Rationality of Perception	0
Recalibrating evolutionary debunking	0
Foundations, Derivations, Applications: Replies to Bykvist, Arpaly, Steele, and Tenenbaum	0