Philosophical Studies

Papers
(The TQCC of Philosophical Studies is 2. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-04-01 to 2024-04-01.)
ArticleCitations
Interspecies justice: agency, self-determination, and assent27
Inquiry and the epistemic23
There is no dilemma for conceptual engineering. Reply to Max Deutsch20
Reconsidering the Dispositional Essentialist Canon18
Reflective Situated Normativity17
Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming17
Could a middle level be the most fundamental?17
Sensitivity, safety, and impossible worlds14
Quantum indeterminacy and the double-slit experiment12
Welfare comparisons within and across species11
Explaining contingent facts10
How to engineer a concept10
The governance of laws of nature: guidance and production10
Graded epistemic justification9
What theoretical equivalence could not be9
Infinite aggregation: expanded addition9
Circular and question-begging responses to religious disagreement and debunking arguments9
Explaining essences9
The fundamental and the brute9
The experience requirement on well-being9
Indicative conditionals: probabilities and relevance9
Epistemic injustice and deepened disagreement8
Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering8
The epistemic status of the imagination8
Falsifying generic stereotypes8
The normality of error8
Cognitive penetration and informational encapsulation: Have we been failing the module?8
Still the same dilemma for conceptual engineers: reply to Koch8
Revisionist reporting7
Explicit nonconceptual metacognition7
Subject-matter and intensional operators I: conditional-agnostic analytic implication7
Function essentialism about artifacts7
Akratic (epistemic) modesty7
A pluralist account of the basis of moral status6
Being in a position to know6
Invariance as a basis for necessity and laws6
Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency6
What’s wrong with epistemic trespassing?6
Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge6
From relational equality to personal responsibility6
A pluralistic account of degrees of control in addiction6
To lie or to mislead?6
Social kinds are essentially mind-dependent6
Objective falsity is essential to lying: an argument from convergent evidence5
Tamers, deniers, and me5
Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation?5
Skepticism and the principle of sufficient reason5
Supererogation and conditional obligation5
Escaping the natural attitude about gender5
The psychological speciesism of humanism5
A robust hybrid theory of well-being5
Higher-order metaphysics and the tropes versus universals dispute5
Counterfactual theories of causation and the problem of large causes5
One or two? A Process View of pregnancy5
Narrative testimony5
Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization5
The dark side of niche construction5
Lying: Knowledge or belief?5
The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion5
Agnosticism as settled indecision5
Hume’s theory of justice and Vanderschraaf’s vulnerablity objection5
Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence5
The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth5
The only ethical argument for positive δ? Partiality and pure time preference5
“What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu”5
Mental imagery: pulling the plug on perceptualism5
An honest look at hybrid theories of pleasure5
Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’5
Disability: a justice-based account4
The explanation of logical theorems and reductive truthmakers4
Being and holding responsible: Reconciling the disputants through a meaning-based Strawsonian account4
Reply to critics4
Malleable character: organizational behavior meets virtue ethics and situationism4
The incentives account of feasibility4
Respect and the reality of apparent reasons4
Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness4
Should explanation be a guide to ground?4
Classical recapture and maximality4
The way things go: moral relativism and suspension of judgment4
Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?4
When do nudges undermine voluntary consent?4
Speciesism and tribalism: embarrassing origins4
The ethics of emergencies4
Justification and the knowledge-connection4
The many-property problem is your problem, too4
Rational supererogation and epistemic permissivism4
Legal proof and statistical conjunctions4
Explanation impossible4
The explanatory objection to the fitting attitude analysis of value4
Living without microphysical supervenience4
Aesthetic knowledge4
The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism4
Reconceptualizing solidarity as power from below4
A new principle of plural harm4
Emotion and attention4
On making a difference: towards a minimally non-trivial version of the identity of indiscernibles4
What’s so naïve about naïve realism?4
Exploding stories and the limits of fiction4
The self-effacing functionality of blame4
Radical epistemology, structural explanations, and epistemic weaponry3
Emotions as modulators of desire3
Responses to Herman Cappelen and Jennifer Nado3
Setting the story straight: fictionalism about grounding3
Saving the armchair by experiment: what works in economics doesn’t work in philosophy3
Global expressivism as global subjectivism3
Dual processes, dual virtues3
Infinite options, intransitive value, and supererogation3
Assertion remains strong3
Plural harm: plural problems3
Regrettable beliefs3
The case for egalitarian consciousness raising in higher education3
Agential capacities: a capacity to guide3
Arbitrary grounding3
Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias3
Centering the Principal Principle3
Weighing and aggregating reasons under uncertainty: a trilemma3
Rational monism and rational pluralism3
Two grounds of liability3
Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?3
Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism3
Recognition trust3
Cultural appropriation and aesthetic normativity3
Knowledge of future contingents3
When normal is normative: The ethical significance of conforming to reasonable expectations3
Explaining value: on Orsi and Garcia’s explanatory objection to the fitting-attitude analysis3
The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission3
Wanting what’s not best3
Value-based accounts of normative powers and the wishful thinking objection3
The impossibility of a satisfactory population prospect axiology (independently of Finite Fine-Grainedness)3
Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief3
Intrinsicality and the classification of uninstantiable properties3
Explanatory priority monism3
Two notions of fusion and the landscape of extensionality3
Is higher-order evidence evidence?3
Convention, correlation and consistency3
Epistemology without guidance3
Blur and interoceptive vision3
Physicalism without supervenience3
Identifying finite cardinal abstracts3
Structural causes of citation gaps3
Agents of change: temporal flow and feeling oneself act3
From the fixity of the past to the fixity of the independent2
Is ‘cause’ ambiguous?2
In defense of Countabilism2
Non-ideal prescriptions for the morally uncertain2
Knowledge from multiple experiences2
Nonconsensual neurocorrectives, bypassing, and free action2
Independent alternatives2
Is mutual advantage a general theory of justice? More domain worries2
Anaphora and negation2
Precis of Strategic justice: convention and problems of balancing divergent interests2
What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought2
An impossibility result on methodological individualism2
Misinformation, subjectivism, and the rational criticizability of desire2
The subject and its apparatus: are they ontological trash?2
The Nonconsequentialist Argument from Evil2
Attitudes toward risk are complicated: experimental evidence for the re-individuation approach to risk-attitudes2
Russellian physicalism and its dilemma2
Just because it’s a phobia doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be afraid2
Philosophizing out of bounds2
Work and social alienation2
Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future2
Illusory attitudes and the playful stoic2
Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable2
Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons2
Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory?2
One: but not the same2
At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing2
Towards a logic for ‘because’2
The prospects of emotional dogmatism2
Flat mechanisms: a reductionist approach to levels in mechanistic explanations2
A puzzle about enkratic reasoning2
Metaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation2
Correction to: Transformative experience and the shark problem2
The irrelevance of intentions to refer: demonstratives and demonstrations2
Real and ideal rationality2
A new defense of Tarski's solution to the liar paradox2
What do we see in pictures? The sensory individuals of picture perception2
Hybrid theories, psychological plausibility, and the human/animal divide2
Why animalism matters2
In search of doxastic involuntarism2
Slurs under quotation2
Rationally irresolvable disagreement2
The medical model, with a human face2
Pluralities, counterparts, and groups2
How to modify the strength of a reason2
Moral rights without balancing2
You say you want a revolution: two notions of probabilistic independence2
Against triggering accounts of robust reason-giving2
Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks2
Desire and motivation in desire theories of well-being2
Interpretative expressivism: A theory of normative belief2
Situationism, capacities and culpability2
The laws of modality2
On the necessity of essence2
What if ideal advice conflicts? A dilemma for idealizing accounts of normative practical reasons2
Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes)2
The concept of responsibility in the ethics of self-defense and war2
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