OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The TQCC of Philosophical Quarterly is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-11-01 to 2024-11-01.)

Article	Citations
Groundwork for a Fallibilist Account of Mathematics	19
Reimagining Illocutionary Force	16
Gene Editing, Identity and Benefit	14
The Focus Theory of Hope	14
Eating Local: A philosophical toolbox	10
Agency, Power, and Injustice in Metalinguistic Disagreement	9
Mapping the Visual Icon	7
The Varieties of Agnosticism	7
Authorial Intention, Readers’ Creation, and Reference Shift	6
On Reflection	6
Arguing About Extraterrestrial Intelligence	6
Why We Need a New Normativism about Collective Action	6
Trust, Distrust, and ‘Medical Gaslighting’	6
Against ‘Good for’/‘Well-Being’, for ‘Simply Good’	6
Pain Linguistics: A Case for Pluralism	6
Content and the Fittingness of Emotion	5
Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck	5
Materialism and the Moral Status of Animals	5
Recent Experimental Philosophy on Joint Action: Do We Need a New Normativism About Collective Action?	5
I, VOLKSWAGEN	5
Laws of Nature: Necessary and Contingent	5
Sharing Burdensome Work	5
Fragmentalism We can Believe in	4
Centering the Everett Interpretation	4
Saving Sensitivity	4

Quantum Gravity and Mereology: Not So Simple	4
Narrative, Second-Person Experience, and Self-Perception: A Reason it is Good to Conceive of One’s Life Narratively	4
Fictions that Purport to Tell the Truth	4
Meta-Metasemantics, or the Quest for the One True Metasemantics	4
Are Humans the Only Rational Animals?	4
Alethic Openness and the Growing Block Theory of Time	3
Evidentialism and Epistemic Duties to Inquire	3
Pregnancy, Parthood and Proper Overlap: A Critique of Kingma	3
The Paradox of Pain	3
Meaning, Rationality, and Guidance	3
Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists	3
Sensorimotor Relationalism and Conscious Vision	3
Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning	3
Can Risk Aversion Survive the Long Run?	3
On Bitcoin: A Study in Applied Metaphysics	2
Understanding Artificial Agency	2
What is Structural Rationality?	2
The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation	2
Legislating Taste	2
Explicating Agency: The Case of Visual Attention	2
Degrees of Acceptance	2
On Powers BSAs	2
Can Civic Friendship Ground Public Reason?	2
Outline of a Theory of Reasons	2
The Proper Formulation of the Minimalist Theory of Truth	2
Separating action and knowledge	2
Criminal Proof: Fixed or Flexible?	2
‘You're changing the subject’: An unfair objection to conceptual engineering?	2
Critical Notice: The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk	2
How Gene–Culture Coevolution can—but Probably did not—Track Mind-Independent Moral Truth	2
How to Express Implicit Attitudes	2
Descriptivism and the Determination Thesis: an Untenable Marriage in the Metaontology of Art	2
Supertropestantivalism	2
A Not-so-Simple Rule for ‘I’	2
Parental Love and Procreation	2
On the Adequacy of a Substructural Logic for Mathematics and Science	2
A Duty not to Remain Silent: Hypocrisy and the Lack of Standing not to Blame	2
Truth Pluralism and Many-Valued Logic: Lesson from Suszko’s Thesis	2
A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention	2
Are Public Reason Liberalism’s Epistemological Commitments Indefensible?	2
Margaret Macdonald on the Argument from Dreaming	2
Against the Doctrine of Infallibility	2
Constancy Mechanisms and Distal Content: a Reply to Garson	2
Introduction	1
The Dialectics of Liberty: Exploring the Context of Human Freedom	1
Strawson’s Account of Morality and its Implications for Central Themes in ‘Freedom and Resentment’	1
Fairness, Individuality, and Free Riding	1
Is the Macro Grounded in the Micro?	1
Truth from the Agent Point of View	1
The having objection to bundle theories of subjects of experience	1

On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure	1
Fine’s Monster Objection Defanged	1
Is Truth Primitive?	1
TIME, AND TIME AGAIN	1
Imagining the Past of the Present	1
Possible Worlds as Propositions	1
Work Hours, Free Time, and Economic Output	1
Sociolinguistic Variation, Speech Acts, and Discursive Injustice	1
Don’t Stop Believing: Fragmentalism and the Problem of Tensed Belief Explosion	1
Is Honesty Rational?	1
Persistence Without Personhood: A New Model	1
Rationality is Not Coherence	1
Towards Affective-Evaluativism: the Intentional Structure of Unpleasant Pain Experience	1
On the Logicality of Truth	1
Shared Agency and Mutual Obligations: A Pluralist Account	1
Coherence and Knowability	1
Realism and the Value of Explanation	1
The Suspension Problem for Epistemic Democracy	1
Prejudice: A Study in Non-ideal Epistemology	1
No Work for Fundamental Facts	1
Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity	1
Knowledge Out of Control	1
How to Explain the Importance of Persons	1
Wittgenstein on Proof and Concept-Formation	1
Cross-Domain Descriptions: The Sensory and the Psychological	1
Moral psychology as soul-picture	1
Can We have Justified Beliefs about Fundamental Properties?	1
Diagnosing Institutionalized ‘Distrustworthiness’	1
A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness	1
Conceptual engineering is old news	1
Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge	1
Restricted Composition is Information Compression	1
Critical Notice: The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False	1
I Hear You Feel Confident	1
On the necessity of a pluralist theory of reparations for historical injustice	1
Fiction And Content in Hume’s Labyrinth	1
Death and Decline	1
Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action	1
ON LIVING THE TESTIMONIAL SCEPTIC’S LIFE: CAN TESTIMONIAL SCEPTICISM BE DISMISSED?	1
The Alethic Platitudes, Deflationism, and Adverbial Quantification	1
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness	1
Language, Science, and Structure: A Journey into the Philosophy of Linguistics	1
Blameworthiness is Terminable	1
Practical Structure and Moral Skill	1
Inferences from Utterance to Belief	1
A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions	1
Metaphysical Overdetermination	1
How Imagination Informs	1
A New Class of Fictional Truths	1
Expanding the Client’s Perspective	1
Why Can’t There Be Numbers?	1
Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice	1