Nous

Papers
(The median citation count of Nous is 1. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-04-01 to 2024-04-01.)
ArticleCitations
The search for invertebrate consciousness52
The atoms of self‐control18
Testimonial contractarianism: A knowledge‐first social epistemology12
Putting explanation back into “inference to the best explanation”11
How to see invisible objects10
What is trustworthiness?9
Aesthetic testimony, understanding and virtue9
Is there an epistemic advantage to being oppressed?9
Are epistemic reasons normative?8
Dilating and contracting arbitrarily8
Making space for the normativity of coherence8
The case for comparability7
The structure of analog representation7
The nomological argument for the existence of God7
Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy7
The dual scale model of weighing reasons7
Fragmentation and logical omniscience6
Communication before communicative intentions6
Higher‐order evidence and losing one's conviction6
Tournament decision theory6
What is social structural explanation? A causal account6
Happiness and desire satisfaction6
Why are you talking to yourself? The epistemic role of inner speech in reasoning6
Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness5
Degrees of consciousness5
Where reasons and reasoning come apart5
A puzzle about fickleness5
Spatiotemporal functionalism v. the conceivability of zombies*5
From time asymmetry to quantum entanglement: The Humean unification5
The puzzle of cross‐modal shape experience5
Optimality justifications and the optimality principle: New tools for foundation‐theoretic epistemology5
Democracy within, justice without: The duties of informal political representatives15
What is social hierarchy?5
Mental filing4
Criteria of identity without sortals4
How to count structure4
Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence4
Reasoning beyond belief acquisition4
Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion4
Mary Shepherd on the role of proofs in our knowledge of first principles4
Consciousness and welfare subjectivity4
The normativity of gender3
The paradox of colour constancy: Plotting the lower borders of perception3
Eyewitness testimony and epistemic agency3
Inescapable articulations: Vessels of lexical effects3
Ignore risk; Maximize expected moral value3
Could our epistemic reasons be collective practical reasons?3
Blameworthiness, desert, and luck3
Self‐prediction in practical reasoning: Its role and limits3
Reflecting on diachronic Dutch books2
Chalmers v Chalmers*2
The proper role of history in evolutionary explanations2
Decision and foreknowledge2
Humean nomic essentialism2
Arbitrariness and the long road to permissivism2
Naturalness by law2
Error, consistency and triviality2
Bias and interpersonal skepticism2
Ramsification and the ramifications of Prior's puzzle2
An explanatory idealist theory of grounding2
Weyl and Two Kinds of Potential Domains2
A transcendental argument from testimonial knowledge to content externalism2
DOES success entail ability?2
Mathematical Pluralism2
There is no measurement problem for Humeans2
A new argument for moral error theory2
An expressivist interpretation of Kant's “I think”12
Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism1
Ignorance and awareness1
Losing confidence in luminosity1
Moral uncertainty, noncognitivism, and the multi‐objective story1
Input and output in distributive theory1
Center indifference and skepticism1
Should moral intuitionism go social?1
Disagreement & classification in comparative cognitive science1
Probabilities of conditionals: Updating Adams1
Epistemic akrasia: No apology required1
Issue Information1
Hedged testimony1
Dimensions of Value1
The many‐worlds theory of consciousness1
If you don't know that you know, you could be surprised1
A Kripkean argument for descriptivism1
‘Logic will get you from A to B, imagination will take you anywhere’1
Accurate believers are deductively cogent1
In defense of the armchair: Against empirical arguments in the philosophy of perception1
Faith and traditions1
Group motivation1
Explaining normative reasons1
Identified person “bias” as decreasing marginal value of chances1
A risky challenge for intransitive preferences1
A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values1
Conditional intentions and shared agency1
Letting others do wrong1
Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check1
Imagination as a generative source of justification1
Guard against temptation: Intrapersonal team reasoning and the role of intentions in exercising willpower1
0.025115966796875