OOIR: Observatory of International Research

Papers

(The TQCC of Journal of Economic Theory is 4. The table below lists those papers that are above that threshold based on CrossRef citation counts [max. 250 papers]. The publications cover those that have been published in the past four years, i.e., from 2020-11-01 to 2024-11-01.)

Article	Citations
Internal and external effects of social distancing in a pandemic	129
The economics of data externalities	36
Pairwise normalization: A neuroeconomic theory of multi-attribute choice	28
Systemic risk shifting in financial networks	28
A comparison of regret theory and salience theory for decisions under risk	23
Disclosure, competition, and learning from asset prices	23
Bayesian persuasion with costly messages	22
Optimal test allocation	19
Liquidity constraints and precautionary saving	19
Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem	18
Tournament rewards and heavy tails	18
Information acquisition and provision in school choice: An experimental study	17
Stochastic semi-orders	16
Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics	15
Matching with myopic and farsighted players	15
Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences	14
The anatomy of sentiment-driven fluctuations	14
Public education expenditures, growth and income inequality	13
The value of mediated communication	13
Monetary policy rules in a non-rational world: A macroeconomic experiment	13
Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment	13
Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion	13
Stable sampling in repeated games	13
Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models	13
The strategy of conquest	13

Confounding dynamics	12
Generalized separability and integrability: Consumer demand with a price aggregator	12
Structured ambiguity and model misspecification	12
What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design	12
Information acquisition with heterogeneous valuations	12
Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules	11
Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements	11
Efficiency in search and matching models: A generalized Hosios condition	11
Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility	11
Belief hedges: Measuring ambiguity for all events and all models	11
Lock-in through passive connections	11
Intertemporal preference with loss aversion: Consumption and risk-attitude	10
Continuous unimodal maps in economic dynamics: On easily verifiable conditions for topological chaos	10
Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power	10
Objective rationality foundations for (dynamic) α-MEU	10
Measuring preferences over the temporal resolution of consumption uncertainty	10
Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity	10
Fully Bayesian aggregation	10
Learning over the business cycle: Policy implications	9
On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests	9
Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games	9
A theory of the saving rate of the rich	9
Cultural transmission with incomplete information	9
Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure	9
Gradual college admission	9
Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment	9
Organ donation with vouchers	8
Information design in competitive insurance markets	8
Foundations of ambiguity models under symmetry: α-MEU and smooth ambiguity	8
Match length realization and cooperation in indefinitely repeated games	8
Learning with misattribution of reference dependence	8
Creating confusion	8
Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms	8
A theory of housing demand shocks	8
Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade	8
A solution to the two-person implementation problem	8
Ambiguity under growing awareness	8
Mixed bundling in oligopoly markets	8
Sequential vote buying	7
Cross-ownership and portfolio choice	7
Labor markets during pandemics	7
Liquidity and private information in asset markets: To signal or not to signal	7
Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs	7
Analytic policy function iteration	7
Truthful aggregation of budget proposals	7
Manipulability in school choice	7
A characterization of Cesàro average utility	7
Unforeseen evidence	7
Ambiguity aversion and wealth effects	7
Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions	7

Childbearing postponement, its option value, and the biological clock	7
Dynamic programming with state-dependent discounting	7
Existence and uniqueness of recursive utilities without boundedness	7
A canon of probabilistic rationality	7
Belief-averaging and relative utilitarianism	7
Robustly optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian model with housing	6
Strategic interpretations	6
Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: Simple formulas and applications	6
Ambiguity in dynamic contracts	6
Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition	6
Bounded rationality is rare	6
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production	6
Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints	6
Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness	6
Equilibrium social activity during an epidemic	6
Epidemics with behavior	6
Influencing waiting lists	6
Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence	6
Plasticity of strategic sophistication in interactive decision-making	6
Identification in the random utility model	6
Ambiguous information and dilation: An experiment	6
Learning in two-dimensional beauty contest games: Theory and experimental evidence	6
Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions	6
(Not) delegating decisions to experts: The effect of uncertainty	6
Strength of preference over complementary pairs axiomatizes alpha-MEU preferences	6
Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat	6
Generalized perturbed best response dynamics with a continuum of strategies	6
Equilibrium characterization and shock propagation in conflict networks	6
Assignment mechanisms: Common preferences and information acquisition	6
The limits of meritocracy	6
Structural unemployment, underemployment, and secular stagnation	5
On the existence of Pareto Efficient and envy-free allocations	5
Bubbly bailout	5
Pledge-and-review bargaining	5
Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection	5
Attentional role of quota implementation	5
Informed speculation with k-level reasoning	5
Constrained random matching	5
Shadow links	5
Markets for financial innovation	5
Menu mechanisms	5
A model of social welfare improving transfers	5
Correlation-robust auction design	5
Simple preference intensity comparisons	5
A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints	5
A random attention and utility model	4
Rational quantitative trading in efficient markets	4
Allocating positions fairly: Auctions and Shapley value	4
A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations	4
The supply of hours worked and fluctuations between growth regimes	4
Distributional consequences of surging housing rents	4
Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting	4
Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem	4
Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information	4
Goodwill in communication	4
Optimal epidemic control in equilibrium with imperfect testing and enforcement	4
A game of hide and seek in networks	4
Smooth aggregation of Bayesian experts	4
Reverse Bayesianism and act independence	4
Deterministic debt cycles in open economies with flow collateral constraints	4
Sequential auctions with ambiguity	4
Symmetry in n-player games	4
Destabilizing effects of market size in the dynamics of innovation	4
Virus dynamics with behavioral responses	4
Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks	4
Global manipulation by local obfuscation	4
A general theory of risk apportionment	4
Would you prefer your retirement income to depend on your life expectancy?	4
Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry	4
Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium	4
Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals	4
Pooled testing for quarantine decisions	4
Herding through booms and busts	4
Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections	4
Bayes and Hurwicz without Bernoulli	4
Selling information in competitive environments	4
Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems	4
Distrust in experts and the origins of disagreement	4
Speculative trade under ambiguity	4